Information asymmetries and securitization design by Günter Franke et al.
Information asymmetries and securitization design++ 
Günter Franke* 
Markus Herrmann** 
Thomas Weber* 
December 2007 
Abstract 
The strong growth in collateralized debt obligation transactions raises the question how these 
transactions are designed. The originator designs the transaction so as to maximize her benefit 
subject to requirements imposed by investors and rating agencies. An important issue in these 
transactions is the information asymmetry between the originator and the investors. First Loss 
Positions are the most important instrument to mitigate conflicts due to information 
asymmetry. We analyse the optimal size of the First Loss Position in a model and the actual 
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1. Introduction 
Over the last 20 years the volume of securitizations has grown tremendously. The global 
volume of securitization issuance was estimated to be roughly 270 bn USD for 1997 and 
about 2100 bn USD for 2006 (HSBC (2007)). The recent subprime-crisis depressed the 
issuance volume. Securitizations were accused of fostering intransparancy of bank risks 
which dried out the liquidity in the interbank market. Whether the intransparancy was 
generated by the securitizations or by the complexity of structured investment vehicles 
investing in securitization bonds, is an unsettled empirical question. It is also controversial 
whether securitizations have positive or negative effects on financial stability. In any case, 
many financial intermediaries use securitizations for their management of default risks. 
Despite of this, there is amazingly little research on securitizations. This paper looks at a 
subset of securitization-transactions, called collateralized debt obligation (CDO)-transactions 
which can be collateralized loan obligation (CLO)- or collateralized bond obligation (CBO)-
transactions. In the former case a bank typically securitizes part of its loan portfolio. In the 
latter case the originator of the transaction, a bank or an investment manager, buys bonds, and 
sometimes in addition some loans, pools them in one portfolio and sells the portfolio to 
investors.  
This paper analyses important aspects of the design of CDO-transactions. Given information 
asymmetries between banks and investors about the quality of securitized loans or bonds, 
investors are concerned about buying lemons and, therefore, insist on credit enhancements in 
securitizations which mitigate potential problems of information asymmetry. If a bank, for 
example, securitizes the payment claims of many loans granted to small and medium sized 
enterprises, then investors know little about these obligors, relative to the bank. This provides 
room for adverse selection and moral hazard of the bank. Since investors penalize the bank 
for information asymmetries, she therefore attempts to mitigate their effects. In a perfect 
capital market these problems would not exist. Therefore securitization research needs to 
focus on market imperfections to understand the design of securitization transactions. 
Information asymmetries, costs of financial distress, costs of equity capital, other regulatory 
costs and liquidity premiums appear to be important as well as transaction and management 
costs. The latter include the costs of setting up (internal costs of the originator, fees of lawyers, 
rating agencies, custodians etc.) and managing the transaction after the setup. They are 
incurred by the originator and the investors buying the securities. Thus, various costs pose a 
barrier to securitization. It makes sense only if these costs are overcompensated by benefits. 
These may come from better risk allocation across agents, a reduction of the bank’s cost of 
required equity capital, other regulatory costs and funding costs. Moreover, the transfer of 
default risks in a securitization gives the bank the option to take other risks.    3
The purpose of this paper is to add to the understanding of the design of securitization 
transactions by analysing credit enhancements. The most important credit enhancements are 
contractual obligations of the originator and third parties to bear default losses of the asset 
pool underlying the transaction. In all transactions there exists a First Loss Position (FLP). It 
absorbs all default losses up to a limit, equal to its volume. Investors only bear default losses 
beyond the FLP. The higher the FLP, the more are investors protected against default losses 
and, hence, against problems of information asymmetries. In synthetic transactions, investors 
usually bear only part of the default losses beyond the FLP. They take a limited second loss 
position (SLP) and the originator takes the third loss position (TLP) by not selling the super-
senior tranche. She may buy protection against the losses of the TLP through a senior credit 
default swap. Similarly, the originator need not retain the FLP, but may sell part or all of it to 
third parties. It is not publicly known to what extent the originator retains the risks of the FLP 
and the TLP.  
The market imperfections mentioned above pose a challenge to the originator of a transaction. 
How should she design the transaction so as to maximize her net benefit? In particular, given 
the quality of the underlying asset pool (loans/bonds) serving as collateral for a transaction, 
how large should the FLP be so as to mitigate problems of information asymmetry? Should 
the transaction be structured as a true sale- or a synthetic transaction so as to allow for a TLP? 
How large should be the TLP? These questions can only be answered taking into 
consideration the needs of the originator and those of investors. They insist on a solid design 
of the transaction so as to protect them against potential losses due to information 
asymmetries. We try to answer these questions by, first, analyzing the optimization problem 
of the originator and deriving hypotheses about an optimal design. Second, we investigate a 
set of European securitization transactions to test these hypotheses. In the empirical analysis, 
we also investigate the lowest rated bond tranche sold to investors. This tranche can be 
viewed as the mirror of the FLP since the FLP determines the protection of the lowest rated 
tranche against default losses. Therefore the characteristics of the lowest rated tranche help to 
understand the choice of the FLP.  
To our best knowledge, this study is the first to analyse the impact of the quality of the 
securitized asset pool and originator characteristics on the transaction design. The design is 
the outcome of an optimization model. The optimal design of a transaction is a function of the 
asset pool quality, of the attitudes of investors and rating agencies and of the characteristics 
of the originator. This function is investigated in this paper. We assume that this function is 
the same for all CDO-securitization transactions and, thus, exogenous to the originator. Her 
job is to design the transaction according to this function because there is no way for her to do 
better.   4
The main findings of the paper can be summarized as follows. First, a theoretical model 
shows that the FLP should be inversely related to the quality of the securitized asset portfolio. 
The FLP should increase when the portfolio quality declines. The quality of the securitized 
asset portfolio is measured by its weighted average default probability (WADP) and by 
Moody´s diversity score (DS). A lower WADP and/or a higher DS improve the asset pool 
quality. The empirical evidence confirms that the FLP increases when the asset pool quality 
declines. We interpret this as evidence that a lower portfolio quality reinforces problems of 
asymmetric information which are mitigated by a higher FLP.  
Second, the qualitative finding that a lower asset pool quality raises the FLP does not tell us 
how the FLP is quantitatively determined. Therefore, we investigate two transformations of 
the asset pool quality into loss sharing characteristics, assuming a lognormal distribution for 
the default loss rate of the underlying portfolio. The first characteristic is the share of 
expected default losses absorbed by the FLP, called the loss share. The second characteristic 
is the probability that all default losses are fully borne by the FLP, i.e. investors are not hit. 
We denote it as the support-probability of the FLP. (1-the support-probability) is the 
probability that investors are hit by default losses. In particular, it is the probability that the 
lowest rated tranche, i.e. the tranche with the lowest rating, is hit. Its rating is determined by 
this probability according to S&P.  
A simple optimization model illustrates how the loss share and the support-probability react 
to changes in asset pool quality. Empirically, it turns out that the share of expected default 
losses, with a mean of 86 %, is independent of the asset pool quality. This indicates that a 
share of 86 % is the guideline for the market which may be influenced to some extent by other 
considerations. A constant share of the expected default loss implies for the lognormal model 
that the support-probability of the FLP depends inversely on the WADP and, surprisingly, 
also inversely on the DS. This is confirmed by the empirical findings. These findings gives us 
a rather precise understanding of how the market copes with information asymmetries in 
securitizations.  
Third, the FLP resp. its loss share together with asset pool quality are quite powerful in 
explaining empirically the rating and the credit spread of the lowest rated tranche. But the 
credit spread of the lowest rated tranche is better explained by its rating, its maturity and the 
date at which the transaction is arranged. This underlines the important role of the rating 
agencies. 
Fourth, the attractiveness of a synthetic relative to a true sale transaction increases with the 
portfolio quality. Hence, TLPs are more likely for transactions with better portfolio quality. 
Better quality implies a lower default risk of the super-senior tranche, given its size, making it 
less attractive for the originator to buy protection on this tranche through selling it or buying a   5
super-senior default swap. The preference for synthetic transactions is stronger for originators 
with a better rating. Presumably, for highly rated originators funding through standard bonds 
is cheaper than through true sale transactions. Retention of the super-senior tranche is in 
strong contrast to the literature which argues that the originator should sell the least 
information-sensitive tranche. The size of the super-senior tranche, i.e. the size of the TLP, 
increases with the portfolio quality, in contrast to the size of the FLP which is inversely 
related to portfolio quality. This indicates the different nature of the FLP and the TLP. The 
FLP appears to be important for investor protection while the TLP does not and, therefore, is 
driven by other considerations. 
Fifth, surprisingly, characteristics of the originator like her total capital ratio, Tobin´s Q and 
other variables which proxy for her securitization motives, add little to the explanatory power 
of the regressions. This indicates that the design of securitization transactions depends little 
on these characteristics. Essentially, rating agencies and investors appear to be the dominant 
forces.  
The paper is structured as follows. In section 2 the relevant literature is discussed. In section 3 
we model the originator’s optimization problem and derive hypotheses about her choice of the 
transaction design. The empirical findings are presented in section 4 and discussed in section 
5. Section 6 concludes. 
2. Literature  Review 
The design of a CDO-transaction regarding the handling of information asymmetries is a 
complex task. In order to relate it to the literature, we first characterize CDO-transactions. 
Depending on her motives, the originator selects a set of loans or/and bonds
1 as  the 
underlying asset pool of the transaction. In a static deal, this set is determined at the outset. In 
a dynamic (managed) deal, this set changes over time depending on the originator’s policy. In 
a true sale transaction, all loans/bonds are sold without recourse to the special purpose vehicle 
which issues an equity tranche (=FLP) and various tranches of bonds to investors. The 
originator can freely use the proceeds from issuing the tranches including the sold part of the 
equity tranche. In a synthetic transaction the originator retains ownership of the loans/bonds 
and transfers part of the default risk through a junior credit default swap to the special purpose 
vehicle. This swap covers default risks beyond a threshold, excluding the default risk of the 
TLP. This threshold implies a FLP of the originator. The coverage of default risks by the 
swap is limited by the face value of the bonds issued by the SPV. Often the issued bond-
tranches cover only a small fraction of the nominal value of the underlying portfolio so that 
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the originator retains a large super-senior tranche and its associated default risk unless this 
risk is protected through a super-senior credit default swap. Hence, the super-senior tranche 
represents a TLP which is only hit if the SLP of investors is fully exhausted by default losses. 
In contrast to a true sale transaction, the originator does not receive the issuance proceeds in a 
synthetic transaction. These need to be invested in AAA-securities or other almost default-
free assets. In all transactions, the originator decides about the choice of the asset pool, the 
size of the FLP, the tranching of the bonds to be issued. If the originator opts for a synthetic 
transaction, he also decides about the TLP. These decisions are taken by the originator in 
close collaboration with the involved rating agencies and leading investors.  
In the following we summarize the literature related to these issues. There exists a variety of 
papers modelling the optimal design of financial contracts. Several papers show the 
optimality of first loss positions (FLP). In the absence of information asymmetries, Arrow 
(1971) [see also Gollier and Schlesinger (1996)] analyses the optimal insurance contract for a 
setting in which the protection buyer is risk averse, but the protection sellers are risk neutral. 
If the protection sellers bound their expected loss from above, then a FLP of the protection 
buyer is optimal. This follows because optimal risk sharing entails an upper limit of the 
realized loss borne by the risk averse protection buyer. Townsend (1979) considers risk 
sharing between a risk averse entrepreneur and investors in the presence of information 
asymmetries about the entrepreneur’s ability to pay. If the entrepreneur fully pays the 
investors’ claim, then she incurs no other costs. If she does not fully pay claiming that she 
lacks the necessary funds, then this claim needs to be verified. If the state verification cost is 
borne by the entrepreneur, the optimal contract is a standard debt contract: The entrepreneur 
fully pays the fixed claim when her company earns sufficient funds. Otherwise she prefers to 
pay the lower state verification cost and impose some loss on the investors. This is basically 
the same as taking a FLP. 
In a related model of Gale and Hellwig (1985), both, the entrepreneur and investors, are risk 
neutral. However, the entrepreneur can only bear limited losses in order to stay solvent. Again, 
a standard debt contract turns out to be optimal implying a FLP of the entrepreneur.  
In the previous two papers information asymmetries are resolved through state verification. 
The more recent literature distinguishes between information-sensitive and -insensitive 
securities. Information-insensitive securities are subject to little information asymmetries, in 
contrast to information-sensitive securities. Boot and Thakor (1993) argue that a risky cash 
flow should be split into a senior and a subordinated security. The senior security is 
information-insensitive and can be sold to uninformed investors while the subordinated 
security is information-sensitive and should be sold to informed investors. This allows the 
seller of the cash flow to raise the sales revenue. Riddiough (1997) extends this reasoning by 
showing that loan bundling allows for pool diversification which softens information   7
asymmetries. Moreover, the holder of the junior security should control changes in the loan 
portfolio because she primarily bears the consequences.
2 
DeMarzo and Duffie (1999) analyse the security-design assuming a tradeoff between the 
retention cost of holding cash flows and the liquidity cost of selling information-sensitive 
securities. They also prove that a standard debt contract is optimal and that an issuer with very 
profitable investment opportunities retains little default risk in a securitisation transaction. In 
a recent paper DeMarzo (2005) shows that pooling of assets has an information destruction 
effect since it prohibits the seller to sell asset cash flows separately and, thereby, optimize 
asset specific sales. But pooling also has a beneficial diversification effect. Tranching then 
allows to create more and also less information-sensitive claims and to sell the more liquid 
information-insensitive claims. This model is generalized to a dynamic model of 
intermediation. Summarizing these papers, they demonstrate the optimality of a FLP and 
argue that the senior information-insensitive tranches should be sold to investors. This is in 
strong contrast to synthetic transactions in which the least information-sensitive tranche, the 
TLP, is not sold. 
 Plantin (2003) shows that sophisticated institutions with high distribution costs buy and sell 
the junior tranches leaving senior tranches to retail institutions with low distribution costs. 
David (1997) asks how many tranches should be issued. Tranches are sold to individual and 
institutional investors. The latter buy tranches to hedge their endowment risk. Hence tranches 
should be differentiated so as to allow the different groups of investors an effective hedging.
3 
There are only a few empirical studies related to securitizations. Childs, Ott and Riddiough 
(1996) investigate the pricing of Commercial Mortage-Backed securities and conclude that 
the correlation structure of the asset pool and the tranching are important determinants of the 
launch spreads of the tranches. Higgins and Mason (2004) find that credit card banks provide 
implicit recourse to asset-backed securities to protect their reputation. Cebenoyan and Strahan 
(2004) document that banks securitizing loans hold less capital than other banks and have 
more risky assets relative to total assets. Downing and Wallace (2005) analyse securitizations 
of commercial mortgage backed securities and find that FLPs are higher than what might be 
expected looking at the actual performance of mortgages. According to Downing, Jaffee and 
Wallace (2006) participation certificates sold to special purpose vehicles are on average 
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valued less than those not sold. Franke and Krahnen (2006) find that securitization tends to 
raise the bank’s stock market beta indicating more systematic risk taking. Cuchra and 
Jenkinson (2005) analyse the number of tranches in securitizations and conclude that the 
number increases with sophistication of investors, with information asymmetry and with the 
volume of the transaction. Finally, Cuchra (2005) analyses the launch spreads of tranches in 
securitizations and finds that ratings are very important determinants besides of general 
capital market conditions. He also finds that larger tranches command a lower spread 
indicating a liquidity premium. 
3.  The Originator’s Optimization and Hypotheses 
The focus of this paper is the design of CDO-transactions in the presence of information 
asymmetries and other market imperfections. If the originator would ignore the reactions of 
investors and rating agencies to information asymmetries in the design of securitization 
transactions, then she might end up paying very high credit spreads. Therefore she prefers to 
mitigate information asymmetry induced problems by credit enhancements, in particular by 
setting up a First Loss Position. The optimal design of a transaction depends on the quality of 
the underlying asset pool, the originator characteristics and the attitudes of investors and 
rating agencies. While the originator chooses asset pool quality, her characteristics, attitudes 
of investors and those of rating agencies are exogenously given. The function relating the 
optimal design of a transaction to asset pool quality is driven by these exogenous factors. We 
assume that this function is the same for all CDO-transactions and exogenously given. Every 
originator chooses the optimal transaction design according to this function. The purpose of 
this paper is to find out important properties of this function. We, therefore, analyse a simple 
model to determine these properties theoretically and then a set of European CDO-
transactions to determine them empirically. 
In this section, first, we relate information asymmetries to asset pool quality. Second, we 
present some general results on the relationship between asset pool quality and loss sharing 
between investors and the holders of the FLP. Third, we present a simple optimization model 
of the originator to derive her optimal monitoring effort and her choice of the FLP. Fourth, we 
derive various hypotheses about the optimal transaction design which are tested later on a set 
of European transactions.  
3.1   Information Asymmetries and Asset Pool Quality 
Transferring default risks through a securitization transaction is always subject to problems of 
information asymmetries between the originator and investors. The originator knows more 
about the quality of the loans underlying the transaction because she has close contact to the 
obligors. Moreover, she decides about her effort of monitoring the obligors and enforcing her   9
loan claims. This effort is not observable by investors adding to the information asymmetry. 
Therefore credit spreads include a penalty for adverse selection and moral hazard problems. 
To model these information asymmetries, we distinguish between the published and the true 
quality of the underlying asset pool.  
Asset pool quality is measured in different dimensions. One measure of the average quality of 
the loans is the weighted average default probability (WADP) of the loans. The higher WADP, 
the higher are the expected default losses of the asset pool. The second measure of asset pool 
quality is a measure of asset pool diversification. The intra- and interindustry-diversification 
of the loan portfolio can be summarized in a diversity measure as done in Moody´s Diversity 
Score (DS). This score can be interpreted as the diversification-equivalent number of equally 
sized loans whose defaults are uncorrelated. A third characteristic of the asset pool quality is 
the weighted average loss given default of the loans. Loss given default is measured by (1-
recovery rate). The recovery rate of a loan is the fraction of its par value denoting the present 
value of all future payments on this defaulted loan discounted to the date of default. Initially 
the par value of the loan approximately equals its market value so that the loss given default 
applies equally to the par and the market value. Since we cannot get reliable data on the 
weighted average loss given default for most CDO-transactions, we assume that this 
characteristic is the same across all CDO-transactions
4. Moreover, to simplify modelling we 
assume that the loss given default is non-random. Hence we characterize asset pool quality by 
the two determinants WADP and DS.  
The rating agencies publish information on the asset pool quality. We assume that rating 
agencies do their best to publish unbiased information. Investors believe this so that they 
consider the published information as the best predictor of the true asset pool quality. But they 
know that the true quality differs from the published quality by a noise term ε, 
published asset pool quality = true asset pool quality + ε. 
We define the standard deviation of the noise term, σ(ε), as quality uncertainty and assume 
that it is inversely related to the true asset pool quality. The intuition for this is that errors in 
estimating WADP are likely to be proportional to the true WADP. If the true WADP is very 
small (high), then errors in estimating WADP are likely to be small (high). We also assume 
that σ(ε) is inversely related to the true DS. As pointed out by DeMarzo (2005) and others, a 
high DS reduces information asymmetries because the idiosyncratic risks of the assets tend to 
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be diversified away
5. The lower the DS, the stronger is idiosyncratic default risk relative to 
systematic default risk. The effects of idiosyncratic risks are almost by definition harder to 
analyse and to predict than those of systematic risk, because idiosyncratic risks are much 
more diverse and less well understoood. Hence we believe that there are good reasons to 
assume an inverse relation between asset pool quality and quality uncertainty.  
Higher quality uncertainty creates more potential for adverse selection and moral hazard, 
because these activities are more difficult to discover when the quality risk is stronger. For 
example, moral hazard of the originator in monitoring loan performance which adds to σ(ε), is 
harder to discover for loans of low quality because these loans often are more exposed to 
hardly observable, idiosyncratic risk factors than high quality loans. Therefore, higher 
uncertainty about asset pool quality should reinforce problems of information asymmetries. 
In the following, the two asset pool characteristics WADP and DS are always understood as 
the published characteristics. Investors assume that these characteristics are unbiased 
estimates of the true characteristics, but are aware of the quality uncertainty-dependent 
potential for adverse selection and moral hazard.  
3.2 General Relationship between Asset Pool Quality and Loss Sharing  
Investor scepticism, driven by information asymmetries, can be reduced by raising the FLP. 
The economic rationale behind the FLP is similar to that behind the deductible in insurance 
business. The higher the deductible, the more damages are borne by the insured, the weaker 
are her incentives for adverse selection and moral hazard, the less important are problems of 
information asymmetries for the insurer.  
The FLP can take different forms. In a true sale transaction, the originator may retain, for 
example, all or part of the most junior tranche of the securities, i.e. the equity tranche, which 
is most information-sensitive. The FLP may be an initial FLP which is a fixed commitment of 
the originator to absorb the first default losses up to a given limit. The initial FLP may be 
supplemented by a reserve account in which interest surplus (interest revenue from the asset 
pool minus interest expense on tranches) accrues over time and which then serves to absorb 
default losses. Hence an originator may substitute part of the initial FLP by a reserve account. 
This would reduce regulatory equity capital requirements. In a synthetic transaction, the FLP 
equals the threshold of the junior credit default swap between the originator and the investors. 
                                                 
5 De Marzo (2005) argues that stronger diversification makes securitization of asset pools more 
attractive relative to liquidating assets separately because diversification reduces information 
asymmetries. 
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The latter being protection sellers cover only default losses exceding the threshold, up to the 
limit given by the face value of issued tranches. The SPV is the intermediary of this swap. 
In the following, we discuss the relation of loss sharing between investors and the holders of 
the FLP to asset pool quality. Without loss of generality, we analyse securitization 
transactions with an underlying asset pool of a par value of 1 €. Hence the default loss of the 
pool equals the loss rate. 
Loss sharing between investors and the holders of the FLP can be measured in a naive way by 
the size of the FLP. This measure does not take into account the asset pool quality. We would 
like to know more precisely the functional relationship between the FLP and the two main 
determinants of the quality of the asset pool, WADP and DS. This would improve our 
understanding of how the capital market copes with information asymmetries. We search for 
an empirically testable model which maps WADP and DS into an economically meaningful 
loss sharing characteristic. Ideally speaking, this loss sharing characteristic should describe 
the equilibrium loss sharing as a function of WADP and DS. Since investors are concerned 
about risk and expected return, it is natural to look at two loss sharing characteristics, one 
being a measure of sharing expected losses and the other one being related to the probability 
that investors are hit by default losses.  
The first measure, the share of expected default losses borne by the FLP, s, is defined as the 
expected loss borne by the FLP, divided by the expected loss of the asset pool. s is called the 
loss share. The higher this share is, the smaller are the potential effects of information 
asymmetries on investors. Although this measure does not consider risk explicitly, the risk of 
the loss rate distribution is implicitly taken into account as it determines the loss share (see the 
following Lemma 1 a).  
The second measure of loss sharing is the probability that all losses are fully covered by the 
FLP. (1- this probability) is the probability that investors are hit by default losses. We define 
the support-probability of the FLP as the cumulative probability of the asset pool-loss rate 
distribution at the loss rate which equals the FLP (in percent of the par value of the asset pool). 
If, for example, the FLP is 4 percent and the associated cumulative probability of the loss rate 
distribution is 80 percent, then with 80 percent probability the FLP fully absorbs all losses. 
Investors then incur losses with 20 percent probability. According to S&P, this probability 
determines the rating of the tranche with the lowest rating. The higher this probability, the 
lower is the rating of this tranche, the more investors are exposed to default risks, the more 
afraid investors may be of information asymmetry. This measure of loss sharing addresses 
default risk by quantile considerations as does the value at risk which is commonly used by 
banks to assess tail risk.    12
First, we analyse the relationship between the loss share and true portfolio quality. As a 
primer, we characterize the impact of a change in asset pool quality on the loss share. This 
impact depends on the direct impact of the asset pool quality on loss allocation and on the 
indirect impact through the originator´s adjustment of her monitoring effort and of the FLP. 
The following lemma characterizes the direct impact of a change in WADP resp. DS on the 
loss allocation. A decline in DS, holding WADP constant, can be perceived as a mean 
preserving spread in the loss rate distribution of the asset pool so that the two cumulative 
probability distributions intersect once. An increase in WADP, holding DS constant, can be 
perceived as a first order stochastic dominance shift in the loss rate distribution. Lemma 1a) 
and b) are proved in Appendix 1, Lemma 1c) in Appendix 2. 
Lemma 1:  Consider a securitization transaction, given the size of the FLP and the 
originator´s effort. 
a) A mean preserving spread of the loss rate distribution, induced by a decline in asset pool 
diversification, implies a lower expected loss for the FLP and a higher expected loss for the 
sold tranches (including the TLP in case of a synthetic transaction). Hence it reduces the 
share in expected losses of the asset pool borne by the FLP. 
b) A first order stochastic dominance shift in the loss rate distribution, induced by an increase 
in the weighted average default probability of the asset pool, implies a higher expected loss 
for the sold tranches (including the TLP in case of a synthetic transaction) and for the FLP.  
c) Given a lognormal loss rate distribution, an increase in the weighted average default 
probability reduces the share in expected losses of the asset pool borne by the FLP if the FLP 
is equal or greater than the expected loss of the asset pool. 
The lemma shows that a decline in asset pool diversification redistributes the expected loss 
from the FLP to investors (and the TLP in case of a synthetic transaction) while an increase in 
the weighted average default probability hurts both, the FLP and the investors (including the 
TLP in case of a synthetic transaction). Whether the loss share increases with WADP, 
depends on the shape of the probability distribution. A simple probability distribution is the 
lognormal distribution. This was also used by Moody´s (2000). It implies a positive 
probability of a loss rate above 1 which in reality is impossible. But this probability is very 
small for realistic assumptions. Consider a transaction in which the average default 
probability of loans is high with 20 percent and the DS is low with 10. Then the cumulative 
probability of the implied lognormal distribution at a loss rate of 1 is 99.9 percent. In typical 
transactions this probability would be higher. Therefore the lognormal approximation should 
be quite good.  
For each securitization transaction we derive the lognormal distribution as follows (see 
Appendix 2.1). The expected loss rate of the asset pool is λ WADP with λ being the loss   13
given default of the loans. λ is assumed to be exogenously given and non-random. We assume 
that all claims in the asset pool have the same loss rate variance S² derived from a binomial 
model of default or non-default, 
S² = λ² WADP (1-WADP). 
We divide S² by the DS to derive the variance of the loss rate of the asset pool. Given this 
variance and the expected loss of the asset pool, we derive the mean and the standard 
deviation σ of the lognormal distribution as shown in Appendix 2.1. Then applying the Black-
Scholes methodology, for each transaction the share of expected losses, borne by the FLP, s, 
is given by 
s = N(h) + (FLP/ λ WADP) (1- N(h +σ))                                                                              (1) 
with 
2
ln
σ
σ
λ
− =
WADP
FLP
h      and 
⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜
⎝
⎛ −
+ =
DS
WADP 1 / 1
1 ln
2 σ  . 
 
The support-probability of the FLP, γ(FLP), is given by the value of the normal distribution 
function at the standardized ln FLP, 
γ(FLP) = N(h +σ).                                                                                                                   (2)                         
N(.) and n(.) denote the standard normal distribution function resp. the standard normal 
probability density function. 
Returning to Lemma 1c), an  increase in WADP reduces the loss share if the FLP is equal to 
or greater than the expected loss rate. This is a weak condition which is mostly satisfied. 
Hence, given the FLP and the originator´s effort, the loss share usually goes down when 
WADP increases.  
Second, we analyse the support-probability of the FLP associated with the loss rate 
distribution as another measure of loss sharing. Again we state a lemma which describes the 
effects of changes in the asset pool quality on this support-probability, given the FLP and the 
originator´s effort. For changes in WADP, the proof follows immediately from a graph of the 
respective cumulative probability distributions. For changes in DS, look at Figure 4 in the 
appendix.    14
Lemma 2:  Consider a securitization transaction, given the size of the FLP and the 
originator´s effort. 
a) A mean preserving spread of the loss rate distribution, induced by a decline in asset pool 
diversification, reduces (increases) the support-probability of the FLP if the FLP is higher 
(smaller) than the loss rate at which the two cumulative probability distributions intersect. 
Given a lognormal loss rate distribution, the latter condition holds if and only if 
6  
DS
WADP WADP FLP
1
1
1
−
+ ≥ λ .   
b) A first order stochastic dominance shift in the loss rate distribution, induced by an increase 
in the weighted average default probability of the asset pool, reduces the support-probability 
of the FLP. 
 
Not surprisingly, Lemma 2 states that a higher WADP lowers the support-probability of the 
FLP. Also a deterioration of the asset pool quality given by a lower DS lowers the support-
probability if the FLP is higher than the loss rate at which the two cumulative probability 
distributions intersect. For a lognormal distribution, the latter condition is satisfied if the FLP 
clearly exceeds the expected loss rate of the underlying portfolio. As will be shown later in 
the empirical part, the FLP usually satisfies the condition in Lemma 2. Therefore Lemma 2 
implies that a deterioration of the asset pool quality has similar qualitative effects on the 
support-probability of the FLP as on the share of expected losses (Lemma 1). 
Since the loss share and the support-probability are two different loss measures which might 
govern the size of the FLP, it is important to understand the relationship between both. This is 
given by the next lemma proved in appendix 3.  
Lemma 3: Assume a lognormal loss rate distribution. Suppose that upon a change in the 
portfolio quality, the First Loss Position is changed so that its loss share remains the same. 
Then, given the originator´s effort, the support-probability of the FLP is inversely related to 
the weighted average default probability and to the diversity score, if and only if h < n(h 
+σ)/(1- N(h +σ)). Also, ∂FLP/ ∂WADP < 1 if FLP ≤ WADP. 
Lemma 3 gives a surprising result. Given a constant loss share and the condition h < n(h +σ)/ 
(1- N(h +σ)), the support-probability of the FLP declines if one measure of portfolio quality, 
the WADP, worsens, but it also declines if the other measure of portfolio quality, the DS, 
improves. The condition h < n(h +σ)/ (1- N(h +σ)) clearly holds if the FLP does not exceed 
                                                 
6 For proof see Appendix 2.3.   15
the expected loss rate because then h < 0. But for a very high FLP h would be rather high 
while n(h +σ)/(1- N(h +σ)) converges to 0. Then the support-probability of the FLP would 
increase with the DS. As will be shown in the empirical part, the condition h < n(h +σ)/ (1- 
N(h +σ)) is always satisfied in opur sample. 
From Lemma 3 it is easy to derive the effects of changes in WADP and DS on the loss share 
holding the support-probability of the FLP constant. Since the loss share and the support-
probability increase with the FLP, we have the following  
Corollary 1: Given the conditions in Lemma 3, but holding the support-probability instead of 
the loss share constant, a higher weighted average default probability and a higher diversity 
score raise the loss share.  
 
3.3 Modelling the Optimal First Loss Position 
3.3.1 The Model Setup 
Next we present a simple model for the originator´s optimization problem and derive her 
optimal effort and the optimal FLP. When structuring a securitization transaction, the 
originator maximizes her net benefit. Her gross benefit in a CLO-transaction may be 
summarized by the decline in the costs of required equity capital and other regulations and 
possibly the decline of funding costs. The decline in default risks enables the originator to 
take new risks. Then the value of these new activities contributes to the gross benefit. The 
costs of securitization transactions include the setup and management costs, the credit spreads 
paid to investors, the costs of credit enhancements and reputation costs. The latter costs are 
incurred if investors suffer from default losses and attribute them to bad management of the 
originator. Investors would then charge higher spreads in future transactions.  
In a CBO-transaction, the originator also maximizes her net benefit. However, often she 
purchases the asset pool and securitizes it simultaneously, retaining part of the risks through a 
FLP. Apart from these risks, the net benefit in such a transaction is an arbitrage profit. This 
explains why these transactions are often called arbitrage transactions.  
The preferred size of the FLP depends on the benefits and costs of a FLP incurred by the 
originator. First, consider the benefits. If the originator retains the most junior tranche, she 
saves the high credit spread including, perhaps, a complexity premium on this tranche due to 
high costs of required sophisticated management. A higher FLP may also strengthen investor 
confidence in the overall transaction so that they charge a lower penalty for information 
asymmetry on all sold tranches. This is likely to be true because a higher FLP reduces the 
investors´ share in default losses. Therefore, investors may be more confident in the overall   16
transaction, the higher is the FLP. Second, the cost of the FLP is the cost of the required 
regulatory/economic capital, apart from management costs.  
We illustrate the originator´s choices by a simple model. To motivate this model, first we 
argue why we do not use a signalling model. Signalling models help to analyse the behavior 
of economic agents in the presence of adverse selection problems. These problems also exist 
in securitization transactions. Hence it would be natural to explore a signalling model 
explaining the choices of the originator such that she would be motivated to signal the true 
properties of the transaction
7. The main properties from the perspective of the investors are 
the portfolio quality, the FLP and the originator´s effort in monitoring and servicing the 
underlying loans. The latter is unobservable, but it is important for the evaluation of the 
portfolio quality. The FLP is specified in the offering circular. Hence the crucial properties 
are the WADP (and the loss given default) and the DS of the underlying portfolio describing 
its quality. But these are estimated by the rating agencies, not by the originator. They are 
responsible for estimating and communicating the portfolio quality. They should also forecast 
the orginator´s effort and incorporate it in their estimates of the portfolio quality. Therefore a 
signalling model would have to model the behavior of the rating agencies. This is beyond the 
scope of this paper.  
Instead, this paper analyses a simple model of the originator which ignores strategic behavior 
of investors and of the originator. She faces a cost function and chooses FLP and effort to 
minimize the overall cost in a true sale-transaction. The cost function is  
E(l(e)) + C(FLP) +( a+r) (1- s) E(l(e)) + g(e)                                                                        (3) 
This cost is composed of the expected loss of the asset pool, E(l(e)), the regulatory/economic 
cost of the FLP-risk, C(FLP), the penalty imposed on the originator for problems associated 
with information asymmetry, (a+r) (1- s) E(l(e)), and the cost of the originator´s effort, g(e). e 
denotes the originator´s effort in monitoring obligors and collecting debt claims. Effort is 
scaled such that g(e) is a linearly increasing function. We assume that there is a minimal 
effort  min e  such that e ≥  min e . The higher the effort is, the smaller is the expected loss. E(l(e)) 
                                                 
7 A signalling model might provide a hypothesis quite different from our hypothesis. We shall show 
that the size of the FLP  should be higher, the lower the quality of the asset pool is. Bester (1987) 
showed that borrowers may signal their quality to lenders through the amount of collateral. Since 
the expected cost of the collateral, borne by the borrower, is inversely related to her default 
probability, the expected cost of a collateral is inversely related to the borrower quality. 
Therefore high quality borrowers are ready to provide large collateral while low quality 
borrowers are not. Applying the same logic to the FLP in a securitization transaction, the 
signalling model would indicate that the size of the FLP increases with the quality of the asset 
pool.     17
is a declining, convex function since losses can never become negative. Its negative slope 
increases with WADP because then there is more to be gained through more effort. For 
modelling, we assume that a higher effort reduces the expected loss such that the loss 
distribution improves by first order stochastic dominance. Investors and rating agencies 
cannot observe the effort. But they are assumed to correctly predict the originator´s effort. 
Therefore in equation (3) e is the correctly anticipated effort. 
In the cost function the expected loss E(l(e))  is fully attributed to the originator.  The 
motivation for this is that even though the investors bear part of the losses, they charge the 
orginator for these losses so that eventually she has to bear these losses. We assume that 
investors base their behavior on the asset pool quality communicated by the rating agencies, 
but they are aware of quality uncertainty.  
Investors charge the originator a penalty for problems of information asymmetries. Since 
investors are only exposed to default losses according to their loss share, it is assumed that the 
penalty is based on the expected loss borne by investors, (1- s) E(l(e)). The penalty factor is 
composed of an ex-ante penalty factor a and an ex-post penalty factor r. a and r are known to 
investors and the originator. Splitting the penalty factor into two parts is motivated by the 
sequential decision making of the originator. After the sale of the tranches the originator 
decides about her effort. Investors may provide an incentive for a strong effort by charging ex 
post a reputation cost if they actually have to bear default losses. We model the actual 
reputation cost as r max(0, l(e)-FLP) so that the expected reputation cost is r(1-s)E(l(e)). The 
originator can reduce this cost through a higher effort which, however, generates a higher 
effort cost. r is constant, irrespective of portfolio quality, because investors are assumed to 
charge reputation costs proportional to their realized loss.  
Before the tranches are sold, the originator decides about the FLP. The credit spreads charged 
by the investors include the ex-ante penalty a(1- s) E(l(e)). The ex-ante penalty factor a is also 
assumed to be constant. Since the penalty is charged on the investors´ loss, a high a motivates 
the originator to choose a high FLP which, however, raises her cost of economic capital. 
Overall, the model includes two mechanisms by which investors can reduce their expected 
loss, the ex ante-penalty and the ex post-reputation cost. The higher a and r are, the stronger 
are the incentives for the originator to reduce the investors´ expected loss through the choice 
of FLP and effort.  
The cost of the equity capital required by the FLP, C(FLP), depends on the 
regulatory/economic capital associated with the FLP. In the new banking regulation of Basle 
II the regulatory capital required for the FLP is equal to the FLP. In our model the bank as an 
originator uses economic capital, defined as the value at risk of the FLP. If the originator sells   18
part of the equity tranche, then the buyer would also use economic capital as a measure of risk. 
The value at risk equals for a standardized par value of 1 € of the transaction volume, 
 VaR(FLP) = l(q) – expected loss of the FLP                                              
with  l(q) being the loss rate quantile associated with the exogenously given quantile 
probability q, used for the VaR. This probability is usually below 1 percent. In all CDO-
transactions the probability that the FLP is fully absorbed by losses is higher than 1 percent. 
Therefore l(q) equals FLP. Hence,  
VaR(FLP) = FLP – expected loss of the FLP.                                               
The cost function, C(FLP), starting in the origin, is assumed to be linear in the VaR(FLP). 
This is supported by the observation that banks often require a fixed rate of return on 
economic capital, for example, 20 percent. Since most CDO-transactions have a maturity of 5 
to 7 years, the cost of the FLP has to be aggregated and discounted over these years. For 
simplicity, we assume that the present value of this cost equals 100 percent per € of the 
VaR(FLP). Then the cost function (1) simplifies to 
E(l(e)) + FLP - s E(l(e)) +( a+r) (1- s) E(l(e)) + g(e)      
= FLP +(1+a+r) (1- s) E(l(e)) + g(e)                                                                                  (4) 
In the cost function, we ignore transaction costs because we assume for simplicity that they 
are independent of the transaction design. Moreover, we ignore potential benefits of funding 
costs for the originator because these do not exist in synthetic transactions and are of little 
relevance for the optimal choice of effort and FLP in true sale transactions. We will address 
the funding cost issue later on when discussing true sale versus synthetic transactions. 
3.3.2 The Optimal Effort 
Given the quality of the asset pool, the originator faces two choices, the size of the FLP and 
her effort to monitor the obligors and collect the outstanding debt claims. Since the effort is 
chosen after the setup of the transaction and the sale of tranches, we first consider the optimal 
effort choice. e* mininizes the subsequent cost function (5), given the asset pool quality and 
the FLP. Hence e* = e*( FLP). Knowing this function, before the sale of tranches the 
originator optimizes the FLP which translates into an optimal loss share s*. 
The originator optimizes her effort after the setup of the transaction and the sale of the 
tranches. Then the cost of the originator, still dependent on her effort choice, equals her 
expected loss, s E(l(e)), the variable part of the cost of economic capital, -s E(l(e)), her   19
expected reputation cost, r (1- s) E(l(e)), and the effort cost g(e). The first two terms cancel. 
Hence the originator minimizes  
 r (1- s) E(l(e)) + g(e) .                                                                                                (5) 
This equation shows that the optimal effort is determined by its impact on the expected loss of 
the investors, not by its impact on the expected loss borne by the FLP. This rather surprising 
result is driven by the assumption that the present value of the equity cost declines 1 to 1 with 
the expected loss borne by the FLP. Hence, if r = 0, there is no reputation cost and the 
originator´s effort is minimal. Now assume r > 0. Let g´ denote the constant marginal effort 
cost. Then the FOC for the effort, given an interior solution, is 
0
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The higher r, the higher is the optimal effort. Actually, r could be set so that the optimal effort 
would equal the first best effort, given by the FOC, ∂ E(l(e))/ ∂e + g´ = 0.   
How does the optimal effort depend on the FLP and on the quality of the underlying portfolio? 
By definition, 
∫ − = −
1
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with f(l(e)) being the probability density function of the portfolio loss rate l , given effort e.  
Hence from the FOC,    
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For an interior solution of the optimal effort, the sensitivity of the optimal effort with respect 
to some parameter p, ∂e*/∂p, is given by  
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with the denominator being positive. 
First, consider the effect of an increase of the FLP on the optimal effort. From (9) it follows 
that the numerator on the right hand side of (9) then equals - ∂F(FLP, e*) /∂e with F(FLP, e*)   20
being the cumulative probability of the loss rate distribution at l = FLP, given effort e*. 
Hence F(FLP, e*) is the support-probability of the FLP. Since a higher effort implies a first 
order stochastic dominance improvement of the loss rate distribution, by Lemma 2b), ∂F(FLP, 
e*) /∂e > 0 so that the optimal effort is inversely related to the FLP. This surprising result is 
again due to the fact that a higher effort serves to reduce the expected loss borne by investors. 
This loss is, ceteris paribus, smaller, the higher is the FLP. If FLP → 0, then the expected loss 
borne by investors approaches E(l(e)). Hence the originator´s effort would be maximal.  
Second, consider an increase in WADP. Given WADP,  dl
e
e l f
FLP l
FLP ∫ ∂
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− −
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since an effort increase lowers the expected loss of investors. If WADP increases, then there 
is more to be gained from an effort increase. Hence the numerator of (9) is positive and the 
optimal effort increases. Third, if the diversity score declines, then from Lemma 1a)  (1- s) 
E(l(e)) also increases so that the same reasoning applies and the optimal effort increases. This 
proves 
Proposition 1: The optimal effort of the orginator declines, ceteris paribus, if the First Loss 
Position increases. It increases if the quality of the asset portfolio declines.  
3.3.3 The Optimal First Loss Position 
Next, we analyse the choice of the FLP. Since the optimal effort is chosen in a subsequent 
step, e* = e*(FLP). Therefore the optimization of the FLP has to take into consideration the 
impact of the FLP on the optimal effort. The originator minimizes the overall cost  
FLP + (1+ a+ r) (1- s) E(l(e*)) + g(e*) 
  s . t .     e *   =   e * ( F L P )   .             (10)         
First, suppose r = 0. Then the originator chooses the minimal effort. Differentiating (10) with 
respect to FLP gives the optimal size of the FLP 
)) *, ( 1 )( 1 ( 1 0 min e FLP F a − + − =     .                                                                                     (11) 
The higher the adverse selection penalty parameter a is, the higher is the optimal FLP. This is 
intuitive because a higher FLP reduces the loss borne by investors and hence the adverse 
selection penalty. Moreover, for r = 0, from (11) it follows that the support-probability of the 
optimal FLP is independent of the portfolio quality. By Lemma 2, given the FLP and effort 
and the condition in Lemma 2a), this support-probability goes down if WADP increases or 
DS declines. Hence in order to retain the same support-probability of the optimal FLP, the 
optimal FLP has to go up. This is also in line with intuition. A lower portfolio quality induces 
a higher FLP.   21
 For a lognormal distribution it follows from Corollary 1 that an increase in WADP or DS 
raises the loss share s if the support-probability of the FLP is held constant and if the 
conditions in Lemma 3 hold. 
These results are summarized in  
Proposition 2: Assume that the reputation cost parameter r is zero. Then  
a)  the support-probability of the optimal FLP is independent of the portfolio quality,  
b)   the optimal FLP increases if the weighted average default probability of the asset 
pool increases or, given the condition of Lemma 2 a), the diversity score declines, 
c)  the optimal loss share s increases if the weighted average default probability or the 
diversity score increases, subject to the conditions in Lemma 3.  
It should be noted that according to statement b) the optimal FLP increases if portfolio quality 
declines, but according to statement c) the optimal loss share increases with WADP, but also 
increases if the DS increases. Hence, Proposition 2 shows that in the absence of reputation 
costs the optimal loss share does not react unanimously to a deterioration in portfolio quality. 
 Now suppose r > 0. Given an interior solution for the optimal effort, the FOC (6) applies. 
Hence, the optimal FLP is given by 
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This can be rewritten as 
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This FOC shows the interaction effect between effort and FLP. ∂e*/∂FLP  is negative 
(Proposition 1). Hence the more sensitively the optimal effort reacts to the FLP, the smaller 
F(FLP*,e*) must be, implying ceteris paribus a smaller optimal FLP. But a smaller FLP 
implies a higher optimal effort. Hence the more sensitively effort reacts to the FLP, the 
smaller is the optimal FLP and the higher is the optimal effort. The intuition for this result is 
the substitution between FLP and effort for investor protection. Investors are protected by a 
high FLP, but also by strong effort. Both mechanisms substitute for each other such that a 
high FLP induces a low effort and vice versa.    22
In order to get some insight into the reaction of │∂e*/∂FLP│ to asset pool quality, first, 
consider a very good asset pool quality. Then the optimal effort equals the minimal effort so 
that the sensitivity ∂e*/∂FLP = 0, regardless of the level of the reputation cost parameter r. 
Second, assume a low portfolio quality and a high reputation cost parameter, then the optimal 
effort will be high indicating a high sensitivity │∂e*/∂FLP│. Hence we observe a sensitivity 
increase, moving from high to low asset pool quality. Whether there exists a monotonic 
relation between │∂e*/∂FLP│ and asset pool quality, depends on effort productivity and the 
cost parameters a and r. In any case, Proposition 2c) no longer holds. From the FOC (13), a 
lower asset pool quality reduces the support-probability of the FLP if it raises the sensitivity. 
If this increase is strong enough, then the decline in the support-probability of the FLP is 
strong enough to reduce the optimal loss share s*. This proves 
Corollary 2: The optimal loss share of the originator is inversely related to the quality of the 
asset pool if the absolute sensitivity of the optimal effort to the First Loss Position is strongly 
inversely related to the asset pool quality.  
3.4 Hypotheses For Loss Sharing 
From the preceding analysis, we now derive testable implications. Proposition 2 b) shows that 
the optimal FLP is inversely related to asset pool quality, given no reputation costs. This 
relation remains true if the reputation cost parameter r is positive, but the effort increase 
following a deterioration of asset pool quality does not fully compensate for the increase in 
problems of information asymmetry. Therefore we state the general hypothesis  
Hypothesis 1: The FLP is higher, the lower the quality of the asset pool. 
Regarding the more refined measures of loss sharing, Corollary 2 shows that the optimal loss 
share may be positively or negatively related to asset pool quality, depending on marginal 
effort productivity and on the cost parameters a and r. Since we neither know marginal 
productivity nor the cost parameters, we state the null-hypothesis 
Hypothesis 2: The optimal share of expected losses, borne by the FLP, is independent of 
WADP and DS. 
The alternative null-hypothesis 3 rests on the assumption that there are no reputation costs. 
Then we obtain from Proposition 2a)  
Hypothesis 3: The optimal support-probability of the FLP is independent of the quality of the 
asset pool. 
The optimization model discussed in the previous subsection is based on true sale-transactions. 
In a synthetic transaction the originator retains the super-senior tranche and thus has a TLP.   23
This tranche would also be affected by changes in the DS or the WADP. But since the 
probability is very small that the super-senior tranche incurs a loss, the preceding results for 
true sale transactions are likely to remain valid also for synthetic transactions. Therefore 
hypotheses 2 and 3 are equally tested on synthetic transactions. 
Hypotheses 1 to 3 are the core hypotheses on loss sharing. In the following we derive 
hypotheses about the impact of some other transaction characteristics on loss sharing. 
Hypotheses 1 to 3 are based on the conjecture that loss sharing is driven by the extent of 
information asymmetries. These might be stronger in CLO- than in CBO- transactions, 
controlling for WADP and DS. Loans are often given to small or medium sized firms whose 
identity is not revealed to investors while bond issuers are revealed and often are big firms or 
governments with publicly available information. Therefore CLO-transactions might offer 
more potential for adverse selection than CBO-transactions, controlling for WADP and DS. 
Also moral hazard problems might be stronger in CLO- than in CBO-transactions. In a CLO-
transaction the originator remains the servicer of the loans so that the loan sale generates a 
moral hazard problem. In a CBO-transaction, the originator is not the servicer of the bonds 
eliminating the associated moral hazard on her side. Yet there may exist a moral hazard 
problem of the trustees in the bond issues. But these risks are diversified given many different 
bond trustees while the servicer risk in the CLO-transaction is not diversified (see also 
deMarzo (2005)). Therefore CLO-transactions may invoke more investor skepticism than 
CBO-transactions, given the same WADP and DS. Originators may respond to this by higher 
FLPs in CLO-transactions. This motivates 
Hypothesis 4: Given the same quality of the asset pool, loss sharing through the FLP is 
higher in CLO- than in CBO- transactions.  
Hypothesis 4 makes a statement on the optimal FLP in CLO- and CBO-transactions, given the 
same asset pool quality. This qualification may be problematic. If investors charge higher 
credits spreads for portfolios with lower diversification, then it pays for the originator to put 
together a well diversified asset portfolio. In a CLO-transaction this is easy for a bank with a 
large loan portfolio. Therefore we conjecture that the loan portfolio in a CLO-transaction will 
show a high DS. The situation is different for CBO-transactions. In a CBO-transaction the 
originator has to buy the bonds for the asset pool. This is often costly since the bond market is 
rather illiquid. Therefore we hypothesize that loan portfolios are better diversified.  
Hypothesis 5:  The diversity score of the asset pool is higher in CLO- than in CBO- 
transactions.  
If Hypothesis 5 is correct, then the better diversification of CLO-transactions may render 
FLPs in CLO-transactions smaller than in CBO-transactions.   24
The originator faces the choice between a static and a dynamic (managed) transaction. In a 
static transaction the original asset pool cannot be changed subsequently by the originator. In 
contrast, the originator may change the asset pool in a dynamic transaction subject to 
constraints specified in the offering circular. She may replenish the pool after repayment of 
some assets or substitute new for existing assets. This induces another moral hazard problem 
which can be mitigated by a higher FLP. This motivates  
Hypothesis 6: Given the same quality of the asset pool, loss sharing through the FLP is 
higher in managed than in static transactions.  
A higher FLP retained by the originator reduces her opportunities for taking new risks. 
Therefore an originator with better investment opportunities should take a smaller FLP. As 
argued by De Marzo and Duffie (1999), she would transfer more default risks, the more 
valuable her real options are. 
Hypothesis 7: Banks with more valuable real options reduce loss sharing through the FLP. 
3.5  Hypotheses about the Lowest Rated Tranche 
Closely related to the loss sharing through the FLP are the properties of the lowest rated 
tranche, i.e. the most subordinate tranche sold to investors. This tranche is hit by default 
losses only if FLP
8 is completely exhausted by default losses. The higher the FLP, the higher 
is the loss sharing of the FLP. According to S&P, (1-support probability) determines the 
launch or initial rating (= rating at the issue date) of the lowest rated tranche. According to 
Moody´s, the expected loss per invested € of a tranche determines its rating. Therefore not 
only the loss sharing of the FLP matters, but also the size (thickness) of the tranche. Given the 
FLP, a thicker tranche implicitly includes part of better tranches so that the expected loss per 
invested € is lower. Therefore, the size of a tranche might also matter for its rating. Hence, 
given the loss rate distribution of the asset pool, the rating (credit spread) of the lowest rated 
tranche should be related positively (inversely) to the loss sharing of the FLP and the size of 
the tranche. This motivates 
Hypothesis 8:  The rating (the credit spread) of the lowest rated tranche is positively 
(inversely) related to the quality of the underlying asset pool, the loss sharing of the FLP and 
to the size of this tranche. 
Cuchra (2005) finds that credit spreads of tranches are strongly determined by their ratings 
relative to other factors like capital market conditions and type of collateral asset. In order to 
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find out whether investors rely more on the factors given in hypothesis 8 than on the rating, 
we test 
Hypothesis 9: The credit spread of the lowest rated tranche is better explained by its rating 
and its maturity than by the factors given in hypothesis 8. 
Maturity of the transaction should also matter because the credit spread is paid annually while 
the rating is based on the lifetime of the transaction. 
Cuchra (2005) also finds that the credit spread of a tranche is inversely related to its $-volume 
indicating an inverse relation between the tranche´s liquidity premium and its volume. 
Therefore we also test 
Hypothesis 10: The credit spread of the lowest rated tranche is inversely related to its €-
volume. 
3.6  Hypotheses about the Choice Between a True Sale- and a Synthetic 
Transaction 
While loss sharing in a true sale-transaction is determined by the FLP, in a synthetic 
transaction the FLP and the TLP determine loss sharing. Usually a synthetic transaction is 
partially funded, i.e. the volume of securities sold is only a (small) fraction of the volume of 
the asset pool. The originator often retains part of the FLP and a large super-senior tranche 
being a TLP. If she does not buy protection against the default risk of the super-senior tranche, 
then she takes this TLP. Investors take a second loss position (SLP) through their tranches. 
The TLP reduces the default losses borne by the SLP. But in contrast to the FLP, the TLP 
does not reduce the probability that investors are hit by default losses. Since the TLP is only 
hit by default losses, when the SLP is completely exhausted by default losses, there is little 
protection of investors through the TLP. Conversely, the SLP provides strong protection for 
the TLP. Therefore, investors should neither care much about the existence of a TLP nor 
about whether the originator retains the risk of the super-senior tranche. The latter is anyway 
not publicly known. Hence the previous discussion about the choice of the FLP does not 
apply to the choice of the TLP.  
The choice between a true sale- and a synthetic transaction involves a choice between a) 
selling vs. not selling the super-senior tranche, and b) funding vs. no funding
 9. In a true sale-
                                                 
9    Another aspect relates to balance sheet effects. Until 2004, in a true sale transaction the 
securitized assets disappear from the originator’s balance sheet while they do not in a synthetic 
transaction. Thus, a true sale transaction allows to “improve” the balance sheet. The new   26
transaction the originator may freely use the proceeds from issuing tranches, while in a 
synthetic transaction the proceeds need to be invested in almost default-free bonds. Thus, 
synthetic transactions in general provide no funding for the originator. 
Whether it pays for a bank to sell the super-senior tranche, depends on the quality of this 
tranche and the credit spread required by investors. The quality depends on the size of the 
super-senior tranche. The smaller it is, the larger are the subordinated tranches, the better is 
the quality of the super-senior tranche. Holding its size constant, the better the quality of this 
tranche, the smaller is its risk, making it more attractive for the originator to retain this 
tranche. The tranche–quality is positively related to the asset pool quality. Hence, strong asset 
pool quality would support retention of the super-senior tranche. This motivates  
 Hypothesis 11: Synthetic transactions are preferred to true sale transactions for asset pools 
with high quality. 
Similarly, holding the risk of the non-securitized super-senior tranche constant, its size grows 
with the quality of the asset pool. Hence, the bank can retain a larger super-senior tranche, the 
better is the asset pool quality. This motivates 
Hypothesis 12: In a synthetic transaction the size of the non-securitized super-senior tranche 
(Third Loss Position) increases with the quality of the asset pool.  
If this hypothesis is correct, then investors may interpret the size of the non-securitized super-
senior tranche as a positive signal about the quality of the underlying portfolio.  
Retaining the super-senior tranche is, however, in strong contrast to some papers discussed in 
section 2 which argue that the originator should sell the least information-sensitive tranche 
because it suffers least from information asymmetries. The super-senior tranche is the least 
information-sensitive tranche. Hence synthetic transactions pose a puzzle. The explanation of 
this puzzle may hinge on the funding cost. The originator may consider the credit spread on a 
super-senior tranche as high relative to its default risk so that she prefers not to sell this 
tranche. This is plausible, in particular, if the bank regards the asset pool quality as very high, 
but rating agencies do not share this view
10. We hypothesize that banks with a very good 
rating have little incentive to use CDO-transactions for funding purposes since they can 
obtain funds at low credit spreads anyway. This is impossible for banks with a weak rating. 
                                                                                                                                                          
accounting standards imply for many true sale transaction that the assets need to be shown on the 
originator´s consolidated balance sheet. 
10      The originator may buy protection against default losses of this tranche through a super-senior 
credit default swap. Casual observation suggests that banks often do not buy this protection 
because they feel that it is too expensive.   27
For them it may be cheaper to obtain funds through a true sale transaction than through stand 
alone-borrowing. In a true sale transaction the strong collateralisation and the bankruptcy-
remoteness of the special purpose vehicle render the bank’s rating rather unimportant. These 
arguments support 
Hypothesis 13: Synthetic [true sale] transactions are preferably used by banks with a strong 
[weak] rating. 
These hypotheses will be tested in the following. 
4. Empirical  Findings 
The hypotheses stated above will be tested on a set of European CDO-transactions. We only 
consider multi tranche-transactions because single tranche-transactions are usually initiated 
by investors. The quality of the asset pool plays a pivotal role in our hypotheses. Therefore it 
is essential to have the same type of quality measure for all transactions. Moody’s uses two 
important measures of asset pool quality, one being the weighted average rating factor of the 
assets in the pool and the other one being their diversity score (DS). We include in our data 
set all European CDO-transactions from the end of 1997 to the end of 2005 for which we 
know Moody’s DS and can derive the WADP
11. Most transactions were completed in the 
years 2000 to 2005. Information about transactions is taken from offering circulars, from pre-
sale reports issued by Moody’s and from transaction reports of the Deutsche Bank-Almanac. 
Our European CDO-sample of multi-tranche deals includes 169 observations. This sample 
represents a fraction of about 50 % of all European CDO-transactions in the observation 
period. 
4.1  Measuring Asset Pool Quality 
The expected default loss of the asset pool equals the weighted average default probability 
times the loss given default. Since we mostly do not have transaction specific information on 
loss given default, we assume λ to be 50 percent with exceptions mentioned subsequently. In 
a recent study Acharya et al (2007) document recovery rates for various loans and bonds in 
the US. They find an average recovery rate of 81 percent for bank loans, 59 percent for senior 
secured, 56 percent for senior unsecured, 34 percent for senior subordinated and 27 percent 
for subordinated debt instruments, each figure with a standard deviation of more than 26 
percent. The average recovery rate is slightly above 50 percent. For 2 transactions with 
                                                 
11 We include a few transactions without a rating from Moody´s where the average quality of the 
underlying assets is known and also their diversification.    28
secured loans we use λ = 25 percent. For some recent mezzanine transactions in which the 
underlying loans are subordinated and unsecured, we use λ = 100 percent as the rating 
agencies do. 
 Moody’s assigns each asset a rating factor and then takes a weighted average. This rating 
factor equals 1 for all AAA-claims regardless of maturity. For claims with another rating, the 
rating factor depends on the maturity and denotes the idealized probability of default for this 
rating class divided by the idealized probability of default for AAA-claims of the same 
maturity. We use Moody’s tables to translate the weighted average rating factor into the 
weighted average default probability (WADP). If Moody’s does not publish a weighted 
average rating factor, we use the published average rating of the asset pool and translate it into 
the WADP using Moody´s tables.  
Moody’s diversity score (DS) measures the diversification of the assets within and across 
industries, taking into account also variations in asset size. The DS is defined as the number 
of claims of equal size and uncorrelated defaults which gives the same standard deviation of 
the loss rate distribution as that actually observed.The DS is defined by Moody´s as 
{} ∑
⎭
⎬
⎫
⎩
⎨
⎧
∑ =
==
m
k
n
i
i
k
F F G DS
11
/ , 1 min . 
m denotes the number of industries, nk the number of claims against obligors in industry k, Fi 
the par value of claim i and F the average par value of all claims. G(y) is an increasing 
concave function with a maximum of 5 attained at y = 20. Hence, the maximum diversity 
score within an industry is 5. The diversity score ranges between 1 and 135. Thus, a DS of 1 
indicates “no diversification” and a DS of 135 indicates “excellent diversification”.  
The DS has been criticized on different grounds (see Fender and Kiff  2004). The main 
weaknesses of the formula are, first, that the industry specific diversity scores are added, and 
second, that there is no transparent derivation of the G-formula. The first weakness implies 
that implicitly Moody´s DS assumes that defaults of obligors of different industries are 
uncorrelated. Therefore, in 2000 Moody´s started to use an adjusted DS. The adjusted DS 
explicitly takes into account asset correlations between industries. We also use the adjusted 
DS if we have enough information to derive it. We use the information on the par values of 
claims across industries to take into account the diversification across industries. This allows 
us to use the following formula for the adjusted DS (see Fender and Kiff 2004) 
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As argued by Fender and Kiff, the ADS is quite close to Moody´s DS if ρ(in) = 20 percent and 
ρ(ex) = 0 percent. The formula for the adjusted DS shows that a positive ρ(ex) clearly reduces 
the adjusted DS. Therefore the adjusted and Moody´s DS can be quite different. For example, 
consider a transaction with 15 industries and 10 loans of equal size in each industry, assuming 
ρ(in) = 20 percent. Then the adjusted DS with ρ(ex) = 0 percent equals about 54. But the 
adjusted diversity score with ρ(ex) = 2 resp. 4 percent would be about 27 resp. 18. This is just 
½ resp. 1/3.  
In their simulation tools for deriving loss rate distributions of asset pools Moody´s and S&P 
usually assume that the asset correlation of obligors of the same industry is around 20 percent 
while the asset correlation of obligors of different industries is around 5 percent or below. 
Therefore when we use the adjusted diversity score, we assume an intra-industry asset 
correlation  ρ(in)  of 20 percent and an inter-industry asset correlation ρ(ex)  of 2 percent. 
Alternatively, we also use inter-industry correlations of 0 and 4 percent.  
We know Moody´s DS for all 169 transactions. But we have information about industry 
diversification only for 92 transactions. This is mainly due to the managed transactions. For 
these transactions various criteria for replacing existing claims through new claims are 
specified in the offering circulars, but mostly not industry specific. Therefore we cannot 
derive the adjusted DS for these transactions. Hence we use Moody´s DS for analysing the 
full sample and, in addition, the adjusted diversity score for analysing the reduced sample. 
4.2  Descriptive Statistics and Methodology 
First, we present some descriptive statistics. The sample includes 169 transactions. The first 
table shows their distribution across CLO/CBO- and true sale/synthetic transactions and the 
distribution across years. In the sample 57 percent of the transactions are CBO-transactions, 
54 percent are synthetic. This is an astonishing percentage in view of the literature which 
argues that the least information-sensitive tranches should be sold. This tranche is the super-
senior tranche which is rarely sold in synthetic transactions. 
From the 169 transactions, 136 are arranged by banks and 33 by investment firms. The latter 
buy existing bonds and securitize them. 15 of these 33 transactions are classified as CLO-
transactions, although the originating investment firms buy bonds and existing loans and 
securitize them. Therefore we reclassify these 15 CLO-transactions as CBO-transactions. 
Thus, 33 CBO-transactions, i.e. 1/3 of the CBO-transactions, are originated by investment 
firms, all other transactions by banks. 
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 True  sale  Synthetic  ∑ 
CLO 
CBO 
30 
48 
43 
48 
73 
96 
∑ 78  91  169 
 
Year  1997 1998 1999 2000 2001  2002 2003 2004  2005
number of 
transactions 
1  1  12  26 40 42 16 19  12 
Table 1:  The upper part shows the number of transactions in the sample differentiating CLO- and CBO-
transactions as well as true sale- and synthetic transactions. The lower part shows the distribution of 
transactions across years. 
Table 2 presents the means and standard deviations of  
--  WADP, the weighted average default probability of the assets in the pool, 
--  DS, Moody’s diversity score of the asset pool, 
--  FLP, the initial size of the first loss position as a percentage of the volume of the asset 
pool, 
--  TLP, third loss position, i.e. the volume of the non-securitized senior tranche as a 
percentage of the volume of the asset pool in synthetic transactions, 
--       the ra ting of the lowest rated tranche. Rating is always captured by an integer variable           
which equals -1 for a AAA-rating and declines by 1 for every notch, with -16 for a 
rating of B-. A higher integer indicates a better rating.    
--  CSL, the initial (= launch) credit spread on the lowest rated tranche
12, 
The data are presented separately for true sale-/synthetic and CLO/CBO-transactions. 
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between the coupon and the swap rate of the same maturity as the credit spread.   31
  CLO – ts  CLO – synth  CBO – ts  CBO – synth 
WADP – mean 
WADP – std. 
7.5 % 
7.5 % 
3.8 % 
3.1 % 
13.2 % 
9.8 % 
1.9 % 
3.2 % 
DS – mean 
DS – std. 
87 
46 
89 
30 
34 
11 
56 
26 
FLP – mean 
FLP std. 
6.1 % 
4.8 % 
2.9 % 
1.5 % 
12.1 % 
6.2 % 
3.6 % 
2.6 % 
TLP – mean 
TLP – std. 
- 
- 
80 % (86%) 
23 % (7%) 
- 
- 
87% 
7% 
Ratinglast– mean  
Ratinglast – std. 
-9.4 
 2.8 
-11.7 
 1.9 
-9.1 
3.8 
-8.0 
3.0 
CSL– mean  
CSL – std. 
244 bp 
184 bp 
475 bp 
206 bp 
373 bp 
254 bp 
270 bp 
150 bp 
Table 2:  The table shows the means and standard deviations of transaction characteristics differentiating 
CLO and CBO-transactions as well as true sale (ts) and synthetic (synth) transactions. WADP and 
Moody´s DS are the weighted average default probability and Moody´s diversity score of the asset 
pool. FLP is the initial size of the FLP, TLP the non-securitized senior tranche as a percentage of 
the asset pool volume in synthetic transactions, ratinglast and CSL the launch rating resp. the launch 
credit spread of the most junior rated tranche. The bracketed numbers for TLP in CLO-transactions 
are obtained if three fully funded Geldilux-transactions are excluded. 
Table 2 indicates several interesting properties. The mean weighted average default 
probability is much higher for true sale than synthetic transactions. Also the mean is clearly 
higher for synthetic CLO– than synthetic CBO-transactions. On average, CLO-transactions 
are much better diversified than CBO-transactions supporting hypothesis 5. The average size 
of the FLP is higher for true sale than for synthetic transactions, and within these subsets the 
FLP is higher for CBO- than for CLO-transactions.  
Comparing the average size of the FLP with the average expected loss which is about half of 
the WADP, the average FLP clearly exceeds the average expected loss as assumed in Lemma 
1c). Also the averages satify the condition in Lemma 2a). The condition h < n(h +σ)/(1- N(h 
+σ)) in Lemma 3 always holds, based on an adjusted diversity score with ρ(ex) = 2 percent. 
The average size of the FLP is smaller than the average WADP except for synthetic CBO-
transactions, suppporting the last condition in Lemma 3.   32
The TLP in synthetic transactions is, on average, about 87 % of the asset pool volume with a 
standard deviation of only 7 % for CLO and for CBO-transactions if we exclude three 
atypical Geldilux-transactions. These transactions are the only fully funded synthetic CLO-
transactions, i.e. TLP is zero. Including these transactions lowers the average TLP of 
synthetic CLO-transactions to 80 %.  
The overall mean of the rating of the lowest rated tranche is between BBB and BBB-. There is 
one transaction with only one rated tranche (AAA) and also one transaction with a tranche 
rated B-. Thus, there is strong variability in the rating of the lowest rated tranche. The rating 
(credit spread) of the lowest rated tranche is, on average, lowest (highest) for synthetic CLO-
transactions which have underlying portfolios with strong quality.  
In the following we test the hypotheses derived in section 3. Originator characteristics may 
affect loss sharing. Therefore we distinguish banks and investment firms as originators, and, 
include various characteristics of originating banks in our empirical analysis. These 
characteristics are largely unknown for investment firms, but they matter presumably litte for 
the design of transactions originated by them. These firms arrange 
transactions solely for arbitrage purposes. The involved choices should be largely determined 
by market conditions imposed by investors and rating agencies, not by characteristics of the 
investment firm. 
Banks pursue different objectives in their securitization activities. A bank may want to reduce 
its default risk and, hence, the equity capital requirements. The need for such a transaction 
may depend on the level of its equity capital relative to its risk-weighted assets, on its 
profitability and on its options for taking other risks. Therefore these characteristics might 
affect the transaction design. Similarly, a bank may want to lower its funding costs through a 
true sale-securitization. The need for doing this may be related to its funding opportunities 
using standard debt instruments. Since the costs of these instruments depend on the bank´s 
rating, this should also be true for the strength of the funding motive in securitizations. 
  In order to account for the impact on securitization decisions of these bank-internal 
considerations, in the regressions we include as additional regressors data on the originating 
banks which proxy for these considerations. These data are  
-  data on equity capital relative to risk weighted assets: the tier 1-capital ratio and the 
total capital ratio,  
-  capital structure data: equity/total assets,  
-  asset structure data: loans/total assets,   33
-  profitability data: the return on average equity capital in the transaction year, the 
average return over the years 1994 to 2004, and the standard deviation of these returns 
as a proxy for profitability risk, 
-  Tobin´s Q to proxy for the bank´s profitability and also for its growth potential as 
evaluated by the capital market, 
-  the bank´s rating to proxy for its funding motive.  
These bank characteristics are obtained from the Bank Scope Database. 
Since these characteristics are not available for investment firms and also for some banks, for 
each characteristic we attach a residual dummy RD of 1 to those originators for whom the 
characteristic is not known and a residual dummy RD of 0 otherwise. Then the regression is 
of the type 
y = a + b x1 + c (1-RD) ∆x2 + d RD + ε.                                                              (14) 
x1 denotes the vector of explaining variables not being originator characteristics, b the vector 
of regression coefficients, ∆x2 the bank characteristic minus its average in the sample and ε 
the usual error term. This approach implies that for the banks with a known characteristic the 
variation in this zero-mean characteristic is taken into consideration while for the other 
originators no variation is assumed. d can be interpreted as the product of the average 
(unknown) characteristic and the corresponding “true” regression coefficient. Hence a higher 
average would be automatically compensated by a lower “true” regression coefficient and, 
thus, is irrelevant. If ∆x2 or RD does not add to the explanatory power of the regression, then 
it is eliminated. 
4.2  The Quality of the Asset Pool 
The quality of the underlying asset pool is a core variable in most hypotheses. Therefore, we 
first try to improve our understanding of what drives the quality of the asset pool. In particular, 
we ask two questions. First, does the originator follow a homogeneous quality policy, i.e. is a 
low (high) weighted average default probability (WADP) associated with a high (low) 
diversity score (DS)? Second, do originator characteristics affect the choice of asset pool 
quality? Under a homogeneous quality policy, both quality indicators would be highly 
correlated. Regressing ln Moody´s DS only on WADP shows a negative, highly significant 
regression coefficient. But the explanatory power, measured by R², is only 9.3 %. The reason 
is evident from Fig. 1 a). It appears that for asset pools with WADP below 0.1 there is no 
relation between WADP and Moody´s DS. For asset pools with WADP above 0.1, Moody´s 
DS is rather low indicating low quality of the pool. Hence there is partial support for 
homogeneous quality choice. Looking at the adjusted DS and WADP in Fig. 1 b) confirms 
even more that there is no systematic relation between both quality measures.    34
 
Fig 1.:  Fig. a) shows for 169 transactions Moody´s diversity score DS and the weighted average default 
probability WADP. Fig. b) shows for 92 transactions the adjusted diversity score DS with ρ(ex) = 
0.02 and the weighted average default probability WADP.  
Therefore, we now check which originator characteristics affect WADP and DS. In each 
subsequent regression we include a constant, but we never show it in the following tables 
which display the regression results. The first column of table 3 shows that WADP depends 
strongly on the originator type represented by a dummy of 1 if the originator is an investment 
firm and 0 otherwise. On average, investment firms clearly choose a higher WADP than 
banks. Possibly asset pools with a higher WADP offer more potential for arbitrage profits in a 
CBO-transaction. As shown in the second column, WADP tends to be lower in synthetic 
transactions represented by a dummy of 1 if the transaction is synthetic and 0 otherwise. 
Finally, WADP tends to increase with the bank´s total capital ratio indicating that banks with 
a strong equity buffer take more default risks. Tobin´s Q has no significant impact. 
Looking at the characteristics explaining Moody´s diversity score, remember that WADP 
explains only very little. Hence the third column of table 3 indicates that a substantial part of 
the variation in DS can be explained by the CBO-dummy which is 1 for a CBO-transaction 
and 0 otherwise. CBO-transactions tend to be much less diversified as can be seen already in 
the descriptive statistics in table 2. This might, however, be driven more by the relative ease 
to put together a large loan portfolio than by information asymmetries. Hypothesis 5 is clearly 
supported by the data.  
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Explained variable  Weighted average default 
probability (%) 
Inverse ln  
Diversity Score 
Weighted average 
default probability (%) 
- -  0.001 
 (0.0079) 
0.0006 
 (0.17) 
Inverse ln diversity 
score 
17.0 
 (0.17) 
16.7 
 (0.19) 
- - 
Investment firm-
dummy 
11.6 
 (0.0000) 
8.83 
 (0.0000) 
- - 
CBO-dummy -  -  0.043 
 (0.0000) 
0.040 
 (0.0000) 
Synthetic dummy  -  -5.37 
 (0.0000) 
- -0.018 
 (0.0580) 
∆Total capital ratio  -  1.41 
 (0.0014) 
- -0.008 
 (0.0188) 
∆Tobin´s Q  -  -1.20 
 (0.126) 
- - 
Adjusted R
2   0.371 0.486  0.265  0.350 
Table 3: The table displays the coefficients (Newey-West heteroscedasticity adjusted p-values in brackets) of 
OLS-regressions explaining the weighted average default probability (WADP) and log diversity score of the 
asset pool. The investment firm-dummy is 1 if an investment firm is the originator and 0 otherwise. The CBO-
dummy is 1 for a CBO-transaction and 0 otherwise. The synthetic dummy is 1 for a synthetic transaction and 0 
otherwise. ∆Total capital ratio is the total capital ratio of the originating bank in the transaction year minus the 
average total capital ratio in the sample (see equation (14)). The adjusted R
2 is shown in the last row.  
For the DS it does not matter whether the originator is a bank or an investment firm. As 
indicated by the last column in table 3, high diversity scores tend to be observed in synthetic 
transactions indicating a low risk of the super-senior tranche with a given size. The regression 
coefficient is weakly significant. Finally, DS tends to increase with the total capital ratio of 
the originating bank. The explanation of this finding may be that well capitalized banks lend 
to more obligors so that their loan portfolio is better diversified. Other bank characteristics do 
not appear to affect the choice of WADP and DS. This indicates that the choice of the asset 
pool is largely driven by market factors and less by internal considerations of the originator.   36
These findings are partly confirmed by the subsample of 92 transactions for which we can 
derive the adjusted diversity score with ρ(ex) = 2 percent. The overall explanatory power of 
the subsample is smaller regardless of whether Moody´s DS or the adjusted DS is used. If we 
use the inverse ln adjusted DS to explain WADP, then its coefficient is negative and 
significant, however. The other explanatory variables in the second regression of Table 3 
retain their coefficient signs, but are less significant. Regressing the inverse ln adjusted DS on 
WADP and the CBO-dummy shows no significant coefficient of WADP, but a significant 
positive coefficient of the CBO-dummy. The synthetic dummy is significant as before but 
∆Total capital ratio loses significance. 
4.3  The Extent of Loss Sharing 
Now the main hypotheses of the paper on loss sharing will be tested. First, we look at the size 
of the FLP. Hypothesis 1 states that the size of the FLP is inversely related to the quality of 
the asset pool. First, we OLS-regress the size of the FLP on the WADP and 1/ln DS. The 
reason for including 1/ln DS is that the relationship between the FLP and diversification is 
likely to be nonlinear since the marginal benefit of diversification should decline. The first 
regression in Table 4 confirms this conjecture. The WADP of the asset pool has a strongly 
significant positive impact on the FLP, its regression coefficient is smaller than 1. This is 
expected if the loss share is independent of the asset pool quality and FLP is smaller than 
WADP (Lemma 3).The impact of the diversity score on FLP is clearly negative. Given the 
high adjusted R
2 of 54.5 %, Hypothesis 1 is strongly supported.  
Next, we include in the regression the Synthetic dummy. Its coefficient is significantly 
negative indicating that synthetic transactions have smaller FLPs. Investors may view the 
synthetic structure as a signal of low risk because the super-senior tranche is not sold. This 
may allow the originator to choose a smaller FLP retaining the same published portfolio 
quality. In order to test hypotheses 4 and 6, we add the CBO- and the dynamic-dummy. The 
latter is 1 for a managed (dynamic) transaction and 0 otherwise. Results are not shown in 
Table 4. Both dummies turn out to be insignificant so that hypotheses 4 and 6 are falsified. 
The lack of significance of the dynamic-dummy may be due to the strict rules on 
replenishment/substitution of loans/bonds in offering circulars. Also it does not matter for the 
size of the FLP whether a bank or an investment firm is the originator. 
Hypothesis 7 claims that originators with more valuable real options should prefer lower 
FLPs. Including Tobin´s Q as a proxy for the bank´s real options does not add to the 
explanatory power of the regression, thus falsifying the hypothesis. The same negative results 
are obtained for other bank characteristics. 
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Explained variable  First Loss Position (%) 
WADP of asset pool (%)  0.387 
 (0.0000) 
0.303 
 (0.0000) 
0.293 
 (0.0000) 
Inverse ln diversity score   49.80 
 (0.0015) 
43.40 
 (0.0033) 
43.34 
 (0.0035) 
Synthetic dummy  -  -2.82 
 (0.0004) 
-2.87 
 (0.0004) 
Adjusted R
2 0.545  0.587  0.593 
Table 4:  This table displays the coefficients (Newey-West heteroscedasticity adjusted p-values in brackets) 
of OLS-regressions explaining the size of the FLP. WADP is the weighted average default probability of the 
asset pool. The synthetic-dummy is 1 for a synthetic transaction and 0 otherwise. The adjusted R
2 is shown in the 
last row.  
Next, we look at other loss sharing measures. Hypotheses 2 and 3 claim that the share of 
expected losses borne by the FLP resp. the support-probability of the FLP are invariant to the 
asset pool quality. In order to test these hypotheses, we assume that the loss rate distribution is 
lognormal (for details see Appendix 2).  
This parametric approach to estimating the lognormal loss rate distribution is done for each of 
the 92 transactions for which we can derive the adjusted diversity score. For the 92 
transactions we, first, derive the adjusted DS 2, i.e. the adjusted DS with ρ(ex) = 2 percent. 
Then the implied share of expected losses, s, has a mean of 86.1 percent and a standard 
deviation of only 8.4 percent. This indicates that the FLP takes a very high share of the 
expected losses. It also indicates that the loss share varies only little. For the support-
probability γ(FLP) the mean is 87.62 percent and the standard deviation 14.7 percent. This 
mean is also quite high. Since the inter-industry correlation is controversial, we add the 
figures for ρ(ex) = 0 percent and for 4 percent. In accordance with Lemma 1, the average 
share of expected losses declines from 91.6 to 82.3 percent if ρ(ex) increases from 0 to 4 
percent. In accordance with Lemma 2, the average support-probability declines from 88.25 to 
87.57 percent if ρ(ex) increases from 0 to 4 percent. Surprisingly, the average loss share 
clearly reacts to the assumed inter-industry correlation, while the support-probability is almost 
constant. This indicates that the cumulative lognormal distributions, generated by different 
inter-industry correlations, intersect at loss rates which are only slightly smaller than the FLP. 
We now run linear regressions to explain s resp. γ(FLP) by the explanatory variables we used 
before. The results are shown in Table 5. Regressing the share s on WADP and on the inverse   38
log adjusted DS 2 it turns out that WADP is completely insignificant, while the coefficient of 
the inverse adjusted DS 2 is positive and significant. However, the explanatory power of the 
regression is only about 5.6 percent. Hence we conclude that neither WADP nor DS can 
explain the variation in the share s. This finding supports Hypothesis 2 claiming that the loss 
share is independent of asset pool quality. In terms of Proposition 2 and Corollary 2 this 
suggests that the originator faces both, adverse selection and reputation costs. The second 
column of Table 5 shows the regression results adding the CBO-dummy. The regression 
coefficient is positive and significant indicating that in CBO transactions the FLP absorbs a 
higher share of expected losses. Since CBOs tend to be less diversified, the adjusted DS 2 
turns almost insignificant. Even though the explanatory power of the regression increases, it it 
still modest. 
  Share of expected losses (%)  Support probability (%) 
WADP  (%)  -0.124 
 (0.30) 
-0.128 
 (0.34) 
-1.99 
 (0.0000) 
-2.00 
 (0.0000) 
Inverse 
 ln ADS2 
61.7 
 (0.0145) 
41.1 
 (0.0718) 
64.1 
 (0.0625) 
43.2 
 (0.15) 
CBO-dummy -  5.91 
 (0.0006) 
- 5.99 
 (0.0002) 
Adjusted R²  0.056  0.164  0.596  0.632 
Table 5:  This table displays the coefficients (Newey-West heteroscedasticity adjusted p-values in brackets) 
of OLS-regressions explaining the share of expected losses taken by the FLP resp. the support-probability of the 
FLP. WADP is the weighted average default probability of the asset pool. Inv ln ADS2 is the inverse log 
adjusted diversity score assuming a default correlation between industries of 2 percent. The CBO-dummy is 1 for 
a CBO-transaction and 0 otherwise. The sample is restricted to 92 transactions for which ADS2 can be derived. 
The adjusted R
2 is shown in the last row.  
 
Next, we run the same regressions for the support-probability of the FLP, γ(FLP). Using only 
WADP and the adjusted DS 2 for explanation, both turn out to be highly significant. And this 
regression has a rather impressive explanatory power of 60 %. Thus, Hypothesis 3 is 
invalidated. These findings are not surprising in view of the previous finding that the loss 
share is independent of the asset pool quality. Lemma 3 then implies that the support-
probability should clearly react to the asset pool quality. Comparing this support-probability 
regression with that of the expected loss share shows that the latter much better characterizes 
the market norm. The support-probability depends on the asset pool quality, while the loss   39
share does not. Thus, the market norm appears to mitigate information asymmetry problems 
not through a constant support-probability, but much more through a constant share of 
expected losses borne by the FLP. 
Returning to the first regression of the support-probability, surprisingly both regression 
coefficients have different signs. While a higher WADP reduces the support-probability 
γ(FLP), a deterioration in the adjusted DS raises the probability. The explanation for this 
surprsing result is also provided by Lemma 3. It states that given a constant loss share, the 
support-probability of the FLP declines if the WADP or the DS increases. Thus, this finding 
corroborates the finding that the loss share is independent of the portfolio quality. Adding the 
CBO-dummy turns the DS insignificant while the dummy coefficient is significantly positive. 
Summarizing, the observation that the support-probability can be explained much better than 
the share of expected losses through the regressions, indicates that originators much closer 
adhere to the constant loss share-strategy than to the constant support-probability strategy. 
The constant share strategy appears to be a good approximation to what is actually observed 
in the market.  
It should be noted that a loss share which is independent of asset pool quality does not imply 
that the share is constant. The originator may still vary the rating of the lowest rated tranche 
within close limits. This would raise the explanatory power of the regressions, but also create 
an endogeneity problem. Adding originator characteristics as regressors in the regressions of 
Table 5 does not improve explanatory power. Hence loss sharing appears to be driven by 
market factors, not by originator characteristics.  
The assumption of a lognormal loss rate distribution is sometimes criticised. If one simulates 
the loss rate distribution of a loan portfolio, often the distribution is slightly better 
approximated by a gamma distribution than by a lognormal distribution. Therefore we run a 
robustness check using a two parameter gammma distribution. For each transaction the 
expected loss rate and the variance σ²(l), based on the adjusted DS with ρ(ex) = 2 percent, are 
translated into the parameters of a gamma distribution. While the share of expected losses 
assuming a lognormal distribution has a mean of 86.1 percent, this mean is 84.3 percent 
assuming a gamma distribution. A linear regression of the lognormal-based share on the 
gamma-based share shows an R² of 93.5 percent. Regarding the support-probability of the 
FLP, γ(FLP), its lognormal-based mean is 87.6 percent, while its gamma-based mean is 85.7 
percent. A linear regression of the gamma-based γ(FLP) on the lognormal-based γ(FLP) has 
an R² of 98.9 percent.  
Hence it it not surprising that the regression results are similar. Regarding the share of 
expected losses taken by the FLP, the same coefficients are significant/insignificant taking the 
gamma distribution instead of the lognormal distribution. The significant coefficients have the   40
same sign. And also there is no dominance of one over the other distribution in terms of the 
R²s. The same statements are true comparing the regressions of the gamma-based γ(FLP) and 
the lognormal-based γ(FLP). Hence we conclude that in terms of the regression results there 
is no noticeable difference between a lognormal and a gamma distribution. 
4.4   Properties of the Lowest Rated Tranche  
The lowest rated tranche should clearly reflect the loss sharing of the FLP and the asset pool 
quality. Hence we want to know which measure of loss sharing best explains the properties of 
the lowest rated tranche. Therefore we now analyse two important properties of the lowest 
rated tranche, its launch rating and its launch credit spread. Since we can derive the adjusted 
diversity score for only 92 transactions, the sample is again based on 92 observations for the 
regressions explaining the rating of the lowest rated tranche. The regressions explaining the 
launch credit spread of the lowest rated tranche are based on 82 observations, since we do not 
know the credit spread of the lowest rated tranche for all 92 transactions.  
First, we try to explain the rating of the lowest rated tranche. Hypothesis 8 states that the 
rating of this tranche should be driven by the quality of the asset pool, the loss sharing of the 
FLP and the size of the tranche. Although rating is a discrete variable, we use OLS since we 
have 16 rating classes. The first regression in table 6 strongly supports hypothesis 8 using 
FLP itself as a measure of loss sharing. Since the FLP strongly depends on WADP and ln 
ADS2, we include in the regression FLP-residual, i.e. the residual from an OLS-regression of 
FLP on WADP and ln ADS2. This assures that the coefficients of WADP and ln ADS2 are 
not biased through the impact of these variables on FLP. The coefficients of WADP, FLP-
residual and tranche size have the expected signs and are strongly significant. The explanatory 
power of this regression is quite high with 70 percent. Replacing FLP by the share of 
expected losses lowers the explanatory power somewhat, this effect is stronger using instead 
the support probability of the FLP. As the second regression in table 6 shows, FLP appears to 
be an incomplete measure of loss sharing. Adding the share of expected losses-residual raises 
the explanatory power to 73 percent. This residual is from am OLS-regression of the share of 
expected losses on the FLP because the share is determined by the FLP, while WADP and 
ADS2 are largely irrelevant. The high explanatory power indicates that the rating of the 
lowest rated tranche is affected by both, the FLP and the loss share. In both regressions the 
coefficient of ln ADS2 is negative. This can be explained by Lemma 3. Controlling for the 
share of expected losses, the support-probability of the FLP is inversely related to the DS. The 
same is true of the rating of the lowest rated tranche reflecting that the rating of S&P depends 
on the support-probability. Originator characteristics appear to be irrelevant.   41
Table 6: This table displays the results from OLS-regressions explaining the rating and the credit spread of the 
lowest rated tranche (p-values in brackets, heteroskedasticity adjusted in OLS regressions). WADP is the 
weighted average default probability of the asset pool. Ln ADS2 is the log adjusted diversity score assuming a 
default correlation between industries of 2 percent. FLP-Residual is the residual of an OLS regression of FLP on 
WADP and ln ADS2. Ln size of lowest rated tranche is the logarithm of the percentage size of this tranche. 
Share of expected losses-residual is the residual of an OLS regression of Share of expected losses on FLP. 
Maturity is the maturity of the transaction. Date of issue refers to the date at which the transaction is launched. 
Regarding the rating, the sample is restricted to 92 transactions for which ADS2 can be derived. Regarding the 
credit spread the sample is restricted to 82 transactions for which ADS2 can be derived and the credit spread of 
the lowest rated tranche is known. The adjusted R
2 is shown in the last row.  
Explained variable  rating of the lowest rated 
tranche 
credit spread of the lowest 
rated tranche (bp) 
Weighted average 
default probability (%) 
-0.13 
 (0.0000) 
-0.08 
 (0.0175) 
12.21 
 (0.0000) 
- 
Ln ADS2  -3.78 
 (0.0006) 
-3.93 
 (0.0000) 
- - 
FLP - Residual  0.70 
 (0.0000) 
0.60  
(0.0080) 
- - 
Ln size of lowest rated 
tranche 
0.91 
 (0.0000) 
0.90 
 (0.0000) 
-69.4 
 (0.0003) 
- 
Share of expected 
losses - Residual  
- 0.10 
(0.0216) 
- - 
Share of expected 
losses (%) 
- -  -9.24 
 (0.0012) 
- 
Squared Rating of 
lowest rated tranche 
- - -  -3.00 
 (0.0000) 
Maturity  - - -  22.2 
 (0.0219) 
Date of issue  -  -  63.4 
 (0.0001) 
57.2 
 (0.0000) 
Date of issue squared  -  -  -1.68 
 (0.0000) 
-1.43 
 (0.0000) 
Adj.  R²  0.700 0.732 0.494  0.650   42
Next, we analyse the determinants of the credit spread of the lowest rated tranche. As 
regressors we use the same variables that we used to explain the rating of the tranche. In 
addition, we include the maturity of the transaction and also the issue date because the ratings 
are usually “through the cycle ratings”, i.e. they do not change with the current phase of the 
business cycle. Therefore the date may proxy for this phase and for changes in the market´s 
risk aversion. Since the business phase moves up and down in the sample period, we include 
the date and its square in the regressions. The date is an integer variable equal to 0 for the last 
quarter of 1997 and increases by 1 for each successive quarter. The third column of table 6 
shows the regression results. The adjusted diversity score turns out to be irrelevant, as does 
the FLP once we include the share of expected losses. The maturity of the transaction is also 
irrelevant. This is not surprising given its correlation with WADP of 62.4 %. The regression 
explains almost 50 percent of the variation in the credit spread. As expected, the signs of the 
regression coefficients are precisely opposite to those in the rating regressions supporting 
hypothesis 8. The strong impact of the issue date is given by a parabola with a maximum 
around 2002 which represents a trough in the business cycle. One would expect the IBOXX-
spread, defined by the average yield of BBB-bonds over government bonds, to better reflect 
market sentiment than the mechanical date. Substituting for the date by the IBOXX-spread 
reduces the explanatory power of the regression considerably, however.  
The negative coefficient of the tranche size seems consistent with hypothesis 10 supporting a 
liquidity premium effect in line with the findings of Cuchra (2005). But this conclusion is 
presumably misleading because the explanatory power of the regression shrinks to 41.7 % if 
we replace the size of the lowest rated tranche (in percent of the transaction volume) by its €-
amount. Hence we conclude that thickness drives the negative sign, not €-volume. Hypothesis 
10 is not supported. 
Hypothesis 9 claims that the credit spread of the lowest rated tranche can be better explained 
by its rating and its maturity than by the characteristics analysed so far. This claim is strongly 
supported by the fourth regression in Table 6. Squared rating, maturity and issue date explain 
65 % of the variation in the credit spread, much more than the third regression. We use 
squared rating instead of rating because there is a strong convexity relating the credit spread 
to rating. Maturity has a significant, positive coefficient as expected. Including other 
regressors in the last regression does not improve explanatory power. This is perhaps not 
surprising given that the rating itself depends strongly on the portfolio quality, loss sharing of 
the FLP and the size of the tranche. Overall, hypothesis 9 is supported by the findings. Again, 
originator characteristics appear to be irrelevant.    43
4.5  The Choice Between True Sale- and Synthetic Transactions 
As discussed above, the choice between true sale- and synthetic transactions is a joint choice 
of a funding strategy and of taking/not taking a TLP. Hypothesis 13 claims that originators 
with a good rating are not interested in funding through securitization. A probit regression of 
the synthetic-dummy on the originator’s rating supports this hypothesis. We include two 
regressors, the originator rating minus the average originator rating in the sample, and a 
dummy for those originators for which we do not have a rating. The first regression in Table 7 
shows that the originator rating has a significant, positive impact on the probability of 
synthetic transactions, while the originators without a rating appear to prefer a true sale 
transaction. For them refinancing through true sale appears to be preferable. These findings 
provide strong support for hypothesis 13. 
 
Explained variable  Synthetic   dummy 
Weighted average 
default probability (%) 
- -0.11 
(0.0000) 
-0.10 
(0.0000) 
-11.69 
(0.0000) 
Inverse ln diversity score  -  -6.71 
(0.0050) 
- 6.86 
(0.0085) 
- 3.39 
(0.24) 
∆Originator’s rating  0.225 
(0.0033) 
- 0.22 
(0.0107) 
0.30 
(0.0020) 
Originator rating-dummy  -1.54 
(0.0000) 
- -1.29   
(0.0002) 
-1.33  
(0.0001) 
∆Tobin´s Q     -  -  -0.93 
(0.0010) 
∆Total capital ratio        0.211 
(0.0570) 
McFadden R
2   0.190  0.265  0.362  0.424 
Table 7:  This table shows the coefficients (with p-values in brackets) of binary probit regressions explaining 
the synthetic-dummy, This variable is 1 for a synthetic transaction and 0 otherwise. ∆Originator’s rating is the 
originator´s rating minus the average originator rating in the sample (see equation(14)). ∆Tobin´s Q and ∆Total 
capital ratio are defined analogously. The originator rating-dummy is 1 for originators without a rating and 0 
otherwise. The last row shows the McFadden R
2.    44
Hypothesis 11 states that synthetic transactions are preferred for high quality asset pools. This 
hypothesis is strongly supported as can be seen from the second regression in Table 7. The 
explanatory power of the regression can be clearly improved by including also the originator 
rating and the corresponding dummy for those originators for which a rating is not known 
(third regression). 
In the last regression we test for the effects of other variables. It turns out that the explanatory 
power can be improved by also including the originator´s Tobin´s Q and her total capital ratio. 
But now DS is no longer significant. This may be explained by the correlations between ln 
DS and the new regressors, Tobin´s Q (-0.19) and the total capital ratio (0.24). A high total 
capital ratio indicates a low cost to the originator of retaining the super-senior tranche. The 
negative coefficient of Tobin´s Q tells us that it may not pay for originators with attractive 
outside options to retain the risk of a TLP. 
 
Explained variable  Size of the third loss position (%) 
Weighted average 
default probability (%) 
- 0.015 
(0.0000) 
- 0.015 
 (0.0000) 
Ln diversity score  0.14 
(0.0000) 
0.14 
(0.0001) 
Inverse ln diversity 
score 
1.56 
 (0.0007) 
1.47 
(0.0017) 
Investment firm-dummy  -  -0.06 
 (0.0007) 
Adjusted R
2   0.576  0.588 
Table 8:  This table displays the coefficients (Newey-West heteroscedasticity adjusted p-values in brackets) 
of OLS-regressions explaining the size of the third loss position in synthetic transactions. The investment firm-
dummy is 1 if the originator is an investment firm and 0 otherwise. The adjusted R
2 is shown in the last row.  
Next we analyse the size of the TLP in synthetic transactions. Since we only look at synthetic 
transactions, the determinants of the TLP-size are not necessarily the same as those of the 
choice between synthetic and true sale transactions. We exclude here the three fully funded 
Geldilux-transactions which are atypical. For two other transactions we do not know the TLP-
size leaving us with 86 observations. According to hypothesis 12, the TLP-size increases with 
the quality of the asset pool. This is clearly true for the WADP. The WADP alone explains 
already 48 % of the variation in the TLP-size (not shown in Table 8). Including DS clearly   45
improves the explanatory power as shown in the first regression of Table 8. The impact of ln 
DS is u-shaped. For small diversity scores up to about 28 the TLP-size declines with the 
diversity score, but for higher diversity scores it increases
13. There are only a few transactions 
with a diversity score below 28. Therefore, the general picture is that the TLP-size increases 
with the diversity score. Thus, hypothesis 12 is clearly confirmed. The explanatory power of 
the regression can be improved slightly by including the investment firm-dummy (last column 
in Table 8). The coefficient is negative indicating that investment firms tend to retain smaller 
TLPs. 
Comparing our findings for the size of the FLP and of the TLP, the differences are striking. 
While the FLP-size reacts inversely to asset pool quality, the TLP increases with asset pool 
quality. This indicates that both are driven by different motives. The FLP serves to mitigate 
problems of information asymmetries, but the TLP does not. The TLP-size appears to be 
driven by the effects of the TLP on the originator´s risk and return. The originator prefers a 
large TLP if its default risk is low. Then it does not pay to sell this risk to investors because 
they would charge a relatively high credit spread.  
 
4.6 Robustness  Tests 
A potential critique of OLS-regressions to explain the FLP and the TSP is that these variables 
are constrained to the (0;1)-range. The distribution of the regression residuals turns out to be 
fairly symmetric, with little excess kurtosis. As a robustness test we transform the FLP and 
the TSP so that the transformed variable varies between plus and minus infinity. The 
regression results basically stay the same. Therefore we do not present the results of the 
transformation. 
The discussion about the best way to measure the diversity score has led us not only to 
consider the DS published by Moody´s, but also to consider the adjusted DS based on default 
correlations between industries of 0, 2 resp. 4 percent. The regression results are similar even 
though our sample shrinks to 92 observations. Sometimes the results are stronger for the 
adjusted DS with 4 percent inter-industry correlation. This is surprising but may indicate that 
in former years 4 percent inter-industry correlation was assumed to be realistic.  
There might exist an endogeneity problem regarding the choice of asset pool quality as 
analysed in Table 3. The choice of WADP and DS might be interdependent. We check for 
                                                 
13 For  Z(DS) =0.14 ln DS + 1.56 /ln DS we get Z(20)=0.940, Z(28)=0.935,  Z(60)=0.954,  
Z(90)=0.977, Z(120) = 0.996. Hence, the non-securitized senior tranche would increase on 
average by 4.2 % of the par value of the asset pool if the DS increased from 28 to 90.   46
endogeneity through a two stage least squares regression (2SLS). First, consider the 
dependence of WADP on DS. As shown before, the diversity score is much higher in CLO- 
than in CBO-transactions while WADP is similar in both types of transactions. Therefore, we 
use the CBO-dummy as an instrumental variable. In a 2 SLS inverse ln diversity score is 
regressed, first, on the CBO-dummy, the synthetic dummy Syn, ∆Tobin´s Q and ∆total capital 
ratio (see equation (14)). Second, WADP is regressed on the estimate of inverse ln DS, e(1/ln 
DS), the investment firm dummy ID and the same other variables except for the CBO-dummy. 
The estimation results are 
WADP = 29.9 e(1/ln DS) +   8.86 ID–    5.05 Syn +    1.54 ∆tot  cap ratio – 1.39 ∆Tobin´s Q  
      (0.29)             (0.0000)   (0.0004)     (0.0015)          (0.102)     
This result is very similar to that of the second regression in Table 3 in which the WADP is 
OLS regressed on the same variables. Hence, even though the originator chooses WADP and 
DS simultaneously, this does not appear to significantly affect the explanation of WADP.  
Then we turn the exercise around to explain ln diversity score. As shown above, transactions 
originated by investment firms clearly have a higher WADP, without having a clear impact on 
the diversity score. Therefore we use the investment firm-dummy as an instrumental variable 
for WADP. Hence in a 2SLS, we first regress the WADP on the investment firm-dummy, the 
CBO dummy, the synthetic dummy and ∆total capital ratio. Second, ln diversity score is 
regressed on the estimate of WADP and the same other variables except for the investment 
firm-dummy. The estimation results are 
1/ln DS =0.0009 e(WADP)+ 0.04 CBO - 0.015 Syn - 0.009 ∆tot cap ratio 
               (0.294)          (0.0000)        (0.2073)      (0.0130)          
This result is very similar to that of the fourth regression in Table 3 in which inverse ln DS is 
OLS regressed on the same variables. Hence, the simultaneous choice of WADP and DS by 
the originator also does not appear to significantly affect the explanation of inverse ln DS. 
In the other regressions, we see little potential for endogeneity. The regressions try to answer 
the question how asset pool quality affects loss sharing through FLP and TLP, given 
exogenous originator characteristcs and attitudes of investors and rating agencies. These 
attitudes together with asset pool quality determine the choice of the loss sharing. Including a 
CBO-dummy as regressor does not create endogeneity because CLO- and CBO-transactions 
represent two different types of transactions. Including a Synthetic-dummy is more prone to 
endogeneity problems. But as Table 7 indicates, the choice between true sale and synthetic 
transactions itself is driven by asset pool quality and originator characteristics. Regarding the 
rating and the credit spread of the lowest rated tranche, any reasonable economic model needs 
to take into consideration its size and loss sharing as explaining variables.    47
5 Discussion 
The general presumption of this paper is that information asymmetries are stronger for asset 
pools with lower quality. Therefore the originator faces penalties for information asymmetries 
which are mitigated by her choice of effort and of the FLP. In synthetic transactions the 
originator also takes a TLP. Lemmas 1 to 3 characterize the impact of asset pool quality on 
default losses borne by investors and the holders of the FLP. Propositions 1 and 2 characterize 
the optimal effort and the optimal FLP. While a lower asset pool quality induces a higher FLP, 
its impact on the loss share and on the support-probability of the FLP depends on the size of 
the adverse selection and reputation cost parameters a and r as well as on the marginal 
productivity of effort.  
This paper investigates the impact of asset pool quality on some important aspects of the 
transaction design, given the attitudes of investors and rating agencies and originator 
characteristics. In almost all regressions asset portfolio quality, measured by the weighted 
average default probability and the diversity score, plays a strong role. Originator 
characteristics play only a weak role if at all. In the following, we discuss the empirical 
findings. The impact of both asset pool quality variables on other originator choices is not 
homogeneous in the sense that a higher WADP always has the same impact as a lower DS. 
Therefore we discuss both quality measures separately. The main empirical findings are 
summarized in Fig. 2. The arc relating two variables indicates which variable has an impact 
on the other one. (+), (-) indicates a positive resp. a negative impact. 
Asset pool quality has an impact on all choices shown in Fig. 2 except for the share of 
expected losses borne by the FLP. As stated in Hypothesis 1, low asset pool quality makes it 
attractive for the originator to offer a high FLP to mitigate problems of information 
asymmetries. This is clearly supported by the findings. The two more refined measures of loss 
sharing between the originator and the investors are the share of expected losses borne by the 
FLP and the support-probability of the FLP. The share of expected losses, derived from 
WADP and DS, turns out to be largely independent of both quality measures, supporting 
Hypothesis 2. It appears that this share with a mean of 86 percent and a low standard 
deviation of 8.4 percent represents the strong guideline for choosing the FLP. In contrast, the 
support-probability of the FLP reacts inversely to the weighted average default probability 
and to the diversity score invalidating Hypothesis 3. This inhomogeneous impact of the two 
quality measures is not surprising in view of Lemma 3.  
These findings also shed some light on the relevance of adverse selection and moral hazard 
effects. Given our model, Proposition 2 indicates that in the absence of reputation costs the 
support-probability of the FLP should be independent of the asset pool quality. In the 
presence of substantial reputation costs, the share of expected losses borne by the FLP may   48
decline with portfolio quality. For moderate reputation costs, the share of expected losses 
could be invariant to portfolio quality. Since this invariance is found in the data, this finding is 
consistent with a market in which both, adverse selection and reputation costs, exist. This is in 
line with intuition. 
The FLP is lower in synthetic transactions, controlling for asset pool quality. Strong asset 
pool quality makes a synthetic transaction more attractive relative to a true sale transaction 
supporting Hypothesis 11. Hence a synthetic transaction may signal strong asset pool quality 
so that investors demand a smaller FLP, given the published asset pool quality. In synthetic 
transactions, the originator usually takes a TLP which appears to grow with asset pool quality 
supporting Hypothesis 12. This is in strong contrast to the FLP which inversely reacts to asset 
pool quality. This indicates that the purposes of the FLP and the TLP are quite different. 
While the FLP serves to mitigate information asymmetry problems, the TLP appears to be 
driven by the originator motive to avoid high default risks.  
Loss sharing through the FLP is not higher in CLO- than in CBO-transactions, invalidating 
Hypothesis 4. Our conjecture that information asymmetries are stronger in CLO-transactions 
may be wrong. The generally higher diversity score in CLO-transactions renders idiosyncratic 
default risks rather unimportant supporting Hypothesis 5. Also, loss sharing through the FLP 
is not higher in managed than in static transactions despite of stronger moral hazard concerns 
invalidating Hypothesis 6. This may be due to the stringent conditions for management resp. 
replenishment. Hypothesis 7 claiming lower loss sharing through FLPs for originators with 
higher Tobin´s Q is also not supported by the data.  
The properties of the lowest rated tranche reflect asset pool quality and the size of the 
subordinated FLP. It turns out that the rating of this tranche can be explained to a large extent 
by the asset pool quality, the FLP and the tranche size supporting Hypothesis 8. Including the 
share of expected losses improves the explanatory power of the regression. The DS negatively 
affects the rating in line with Lemma 3. The credit spread of the lowest rated tranche is 
explained best by WADP, the share of expected losses, the tranche size and the issue date, if 
rating is excluded. Thus, Hypothesis 8 is partly supported. The issue date is quite important 
for this spread reflecting changing market sentiment and risk aversion. 
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Fig. 2   It summarizes the empirical impact of the asset pool quality on other transaction characteristics.               
(+), (-) denotes a positive resp. negative regression coefficient.   50
But the credit spread of the lowest rated tranche is much better explained by its squared rating, 
the maturity of the transaction and the issue date, supporting Hypothesis 9. Adding other 
regressors does not improve the explanatory power of the regression. Investors may believe 
that rating agencies have much better information for valuing this very information-sensitive 
tranche and, hence, attach a high significance to the rating. Hypothesis 10, claiming a 
liquidity premium effect of the tranche volume on the credit spread, is not supported.  
Finally, we discuss the impact of bank characteristics. Regarding asset pool quality, Tobin´s 
Q has no effect. Banks with a high total capital ratio appear to prefer asset pools with high 
WADP and high DS. It may be that banks with a high total capital ratio can afford to grant 
loans with high default probabilities and mitigate the high default risk of the loan portfolio 
through strong diversification. A high Tobin´s Q appears to render synthetic transactions less 
attractive relative to true sale transactions. It might be that an originator with a high Q is not 
interested in retaining the senior tranche with low credit risk since she has attractive real 
options. A high total capital ratio makes synthetic transactions more attractive, perhaps 
because the originators, not being plagued by capital regulation, may not worry about the 
default risk of the TLP.  
A better originator rating renders synthetic transactions more attractive due to the funding 
motive. Otherwise this rating appears irrelevant. The funding motive helps to explain the 
puzzle that the least information-sensitive tranche is not sold to investors in a synthetic 
transaction. Fig. 3 displays two histograms, the left one shows credit spreads over 
EURIBOR/LIBOR of European bank bonds with a maturity of at least 5 years, rated AA- and 
better, issued between 2000 and 2005. The right histogram shows the credit spreads of only 
AAA-rated CDO-tranches of our sample. The mean credit spread of the bank bonds is 9.9 
basis points, while it is 40.6 basis points for the AAA-tranches. The minimum (maximum) 
spread of the bank bonds is -27 (+25) basis points, while it is +1 (+100) basis points for the 
AAA-tranches. These figures clearly show that the credit spreads of highly rated bank bonds 
are often lower than those on AAA-tranches. Thus, funding through a true sale transaction 
likely implies a higher funding cost for highly rated banks than issuing standard bonds 
combined with a synthetic transaction. Possibly highly rated banks have a very good 
reputation which is not adequately reflected in their rating. This argument is also supported by 
the recent discussion of a proposal of Moody´s to upgrade the big banks because they might 
be too big to fail. Conversely, a AAA-tranche in a securitization transaction may face some 
investor scepticism because securitization transactions are relatively new instruments and 
there is no reliable history on their performance. Therefore a standard bond of a highly rated 
bank may be subject to fewer problems of information asymmetries than a AAA-tranche of a 
securitization transaction.  
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Fig. 3: The left histogram shows the credit spreads over EURIBOR/LIBOR of 137 European bank bonds with a 
maturity of at least 5 years, rated AA- or better, issued between 2000 and 2005. Data are obtained frorm 
DEALSCAN. The right histogram shows the credit spreads over EURIBOR/LIBOR of the 135 AAA-rated 
CDO-tranches of our securitization sample. 
6.   Conclusion 
This paper investigates how problems of information asymmetries are dealt with in 
collateralised debt obligations through loss sharing arrangements. Market imperfections such 
as information asymmetries, regulatory costs, funding costs, transaction and management 
costs are likely to play a role in the transfer of default risks. The originator optimises the 
design of the securitization transaction so as to maximize her benefit. This paper analyses, in 
particular, the relation of the First Loss Position and, in synthetic transactions, the Third Loss 
Position to the quality of the underlying asset pool and the originator characteristics.  
Using a sample of European transactions, asset pool quality is measured by its weighted 
average default probability and its diversity score. A higher default probability lowers the 
quality, while a higher diversity score improves it. Asset pool quality should be inversely 
related to information asymmetry and have a strong impact on the transaction design. It turns 
out that the First Loss Position is strongly inversely related to asset pool quality. Hence this 
position serves to mitigate information asymmetry problems. This position also is the most 
information-sensitive tranche which should not be sold to investors. The general guideline for 
the market appears to be that the First Loss Position should cover a high share of the expected 
default losses, independent of the asset pool quality. The support-probability of the First Loss 
Position, i.e. the probability that the First Loss Position absorbs all losses, is inversely related 
to the weighted average default probability and the diversity score of the asset pool.    52
Asset pool quality positively affects the originator´s preference for a synthetic transaction. 
More than half of the transactions are synthetic in which the originator does not sell the large 
information-insensitive super-senior tranche. This tranche represents a Third Loss Position of 
the originator unless she covers its default risk through a senior credit default swap. The size 
of the Third Loss Position increases with the quality of the asset pool, in strong contrast to the 
First Loss Position. Hence the Third Loss Position dos not serve to mitigate information 
asymmetry problems. Retaining this position is in strong contrast to the literature which 
argues that the originator should sell the least information-sensitive tranche. Selling this 
tranche does not achieve a substantial risk transfer, but may involve transaction costs and 
relatively high credit spreads so that the originator may consider this funding mechanism as 
too expensive. This appears to be true in particular for originators with a good rating.  
The rating of the lowest rated tranche which is protected through the subordinated First Loss 
Position, is inversely related to the weighted average default probability and the diversity 
score of the asset pool and improves with loss sharing of the First Loss Position. Not 
surprisingly, the same variables affect the credit spread of the lowest rated tranche, but with 
opposite signs. Credit spreads are, however, better explained by the tranche ratings indicating 
that investors believe in superior information of rating agencies. 
Bank characteristics have a surprisingly small impact on these choices. This indicates that 
choices are largely driven by attitudes of investors and rating agencies and much less by 
originator motives. The findings of this paper should be considered a first step. Clearly more 
empirical research is needed to better understand the design of CDO-transactions.   53
Appendix 1: Proof of Lemma 1a) and b) 
a)  A mean preserving spread is a second order stochastic dominance shift in the probability 
distribution of the loss rate, holding the mean constant. Let  ( ) l F1  and  () l F2  denote the 
cumulative probability distribution before resp. after the mean preserving spread. A 
necessary and sufficient condition for a second order stochastic dominance shift is that 
() l F2  intersects  () l F1  once from above. Let l  denote the loss rate at the intersection. 
This is illustrated in Fig. 4. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 4:  The cumulative probability distribution of the loss rate  ( ) l F2 , obtained from  () l F1  by a mean 
preserving second order stochastic dominance shift, intersects  ( ) l F1  once from above at  l l = . 
First, we show that the expected loss of the FLP is smaller under  () l F2  than under  ( ) l F1 . 
Suppose that the size of the FLP is smaller than l . For  l l ≥ , the loss of the FLP always 
equals FLP. For  l l ≤ ,  () l F1   first order stochastically dominates  () l F2 . Hence the 
expected loss of the FLP is smaller under  ( ) l F2 . Therefore the expected loss of the sold 
tranches must be higher, holding the mean constant. 
Now suppose that the size of the FLP is higher than l  . Then, for  l l ≤ , investors do not 
bear any losses. For  l l ≥ ,  () l F2  first order stochastically dominates  () l F1 . Hence the sold 
tranches incur a higher expected loss under  ( ) l F2  so that the FLP bears a smaller expected 
loss. 
b)  A first order stochastic dominance deterioration in the loss rate distribution is 
characterized by  () () l l F l F ∀ ≥ ; 2 1 . This implies a higher probability of a complete loss of 
the FLP. Since a first order stochastic dominance deterioration is equivalently 
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characterized by replacing l through l + ε(l) with  ( ) 0 ≥ l ε  for every l, it follows that the 
FLP and the sold tranches incur higher expected losses. 
 
Appendix 2 
2.1  The parameters of the lognormal loss rate distribution 
Let denote 
λ  =  average loss given default across loans, 
π  =  WADP = average probability of default, 
S  =  average standard deviation of the loss rate across loans, 
σ   = standard deviation of the lognormally distributed portfolio loss rate,   
  () l ln σ σ = , 
μ  =  expectation of the lognormally distributed portfolio loss rate,  () l E ln = μ , 
i F  =  par value of loan i, divided by the par value of all loans; i = 1, …, n, 
j i ρ  =  asset correlation between loan i and loan j. 
Then the expectation of the portfolio loss rate equals 
() π λ = l E , 
the average standard deviation of the loan loss rate across loans, S, is given by 
() ( ) ( ) π λπ λ π λπ
2 2 1 0 ² − + − − = S  
      () 2 1 λ π π − =            ( A . 1 )  
Then the variance of the portfolio loss rate is obtained by dividing through the DS, 
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The latter part of the equation follows from the definition of the diversity score. It is the 
number of equally sized loans whose defaults are uncorrelated which generates the same 
variance of the portfolio loss rate. 
Now assume that the portfolio loss rate is lognormally distributed. Then 
2
P S  =  () [] [ ] 1 exp 2 2 − σ l E           ( A . 3 )  
so that 
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For μ  we obtain 
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From these equations we obtain the sensitivities 
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2.2 Proof of Lemma 1c) 
We show that given a lognormal loss rate distribution, the share of the expected loss borne 
by the FLP declines with a first order stochastic dominance deterioration. The expected 
loss of the FLP equals (FLP – EP) with E(P) being the expected loss of a put on the loss 
rate with strike price FLP. Applying the Black-Scholes model, the expected loss of the put 
equals  
EP = - λ WADP N(h) + FLP N(h+σ) 
with  h = ln (FLP/λ WADP)/σ –σ/2. Hence the share of the expected loss borne by the FLP 
is 
s =  FLP / λ WADP - EP / λ WADP =  N(h) +( FLP / λ WADP)  (1 – N(h+σ)).        (A.10) 
Differentiating s with respect to ln WADP yields 
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Hence ∂s/∂ ln WADP < 0 if the term in the second bracket is positive.         
Next we show that the second bracket is positive whenever  WADP FLP λ ≥ and  
1 . 0 )) 1 ( 1 ( > − + DS WADP σ . 
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WADP FLP λ ≥  implies  0 > +σ h .  For  0 ≥ +σ h  the right hand side of the previous 
inequality attains its maximum at  0 = +σ h  which then yields about 0.1 for the right hand 
side. Hence  WADP FLP λ ≥ and 1 . 0 )) 1 ( 1 ( > − + DS WADP σ are sufficient for 
0 ln / < ∂ ∂ WADP s .  
It remains to be shown that 1 . 0 )) 1 ( 1 ( > − + DS WADP σ . This is always true. Taking the 
square of this inequality and substituting for σ yields   57
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Taking exponentials yields approximately 
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The right hand side attains its maximum at  ) 1 / 1 ( − = WADP DS .  Therefore the last 
inequality holds if  
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This is always true.   q.e.d. 
 
2.3  Proof of Lemma 2a) 
We need to show that, given a lognormal loss rate distribution, a mean preserving spread of 
this distribution implies a lower (higher) support-probability of the FLP if and only if the 
condition in Lemma 2a) holds. 
Consider the probability distribution  ⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜
⎝
⎛ −
σ
μ lnl
N . Differentiate with respect to ln DS. 
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Substituting from (1.10) and (1.12) yields 
2 ˆ σ μ + = l ln . Hence   () 0 . = ∂ ∂ lnDS N at l=FLP if 
ln FLP = 
2 σ μ + .  () 0 . > ∂ ∂ lnDS N  at l = FLP if ln FLP > 
2 σ μ +  for a mean preserving 
contraction. Since  () 2
2 σ μ − = l lnE , FLP ≥ E(l) ( ) 2 exp
2 σ  is necessary and sufficient for 
() () 0 / > ∂ − ∂ lnDS FLP ln N σ μ . Substituting for σ  yields the condition in Lemma 2a). 
 
Appendix 3: Proof of Lemma 3 
We need to show for a lognormal loss rate distribution that an adjustment of the FLP to a 
change in portfolio quality which preserves the loss share leads to a specific adjustment of the 
support-probability of the FLP if and only if h<n ( ) ( ) ( ) σ σ + − + h N h 1 . The loss share is 
given by equation (A.10). Differentiating with respect to ln π yields 
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Hence  0 ln s = ∂ ∂ π  implies  
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The support-probability of the FLP is  ( ) ( ) σ γ + = h N FLP . Hence 
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Hence  0 < ∂ ∂ π γ ln  if the bracketed term is negative. Substitute  π ln lnFLP ∂ ∂ from (A.12). 
Then the bracketed term yields 
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Since  0 < ∂ ∂ π σ ln  by (A.8), the term in (A.13) is negative if  ( )( ) () σ σ + − + < h N h n h 1 . 
This proves Lemma 3 with respect to WADP = π . The proof for DS is analogous.   59
To prove the last statement in Lemma 3, note that  0 < ∂ ∂ π σ ln   and (A.12) imply 
lnFLP ∂ / π ln ∂ < 1. Hence  / FLP ∂ π ∂ <1 if FLP ≤ π . 
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